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THE UNTOUCHABLES:  WHY A VOCATIONAL 
EXPERT’S TESTIMONY IN SOCIAL SECURITY 
DISABILITY HEARINGS CANNOT BE 
TOUCHED 
The validity and moral authority of a conclusion largely 
depend on the mode by which it was reached.1 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Without vocational expert (“VE”) testimony and reliance on the 
Dictionary of Occupational Titles (“DOT”), the Social Security 
Administration (“SSA”) disability determination process would crumble, 
similar to building blocks collapsing when a foundational block is 
removed.2  This is because VE testimony is a building block upon which 
                                                 
1 Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 171 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., 
concurring) (stating that “[s]ecrecy is not congenial to truth-seeking and self-righteousness 
gives too slender an assurance of rightness. . . . Nor has a better way been found for 
generating the feeling, so important to a popular government, that justice has been 
done[]”).  Although alarming, this analogy is meant to demonstrate the seemingly 
controversial deference afforded to vocational experts within disability hearings.  See infra 
note 63 and accompanying text (discussing the deference granted to vocational experts 
within SSA disability hearings).  Because of the deference granted to these experts, the 
disability claimant faces an uphill battle in discrediting the VE’s testimony.  See infra note 
68 and accompanying text (discussing the difficultly in challenging the VE’s testimony).  A 
balancing-act between the fairness afforded to claimants and the need for efficiency 
mandates that the Agency’s superficial safeguards should not generate a feeling in the 
government that justice has been done.  See LINDA G. MILLS, A PENCHANT FOR PREJUDICE:  
UNRAVELING BIAS IN JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING 2 (2002) (discussing that with the large 
monetary award implications and the SSA’s burden of deciding so many disability cases, 
pressure exists to deny claims and decide the claims quickly); see also Michael C. Mason, 
Comment, The Scientific Evidence Problem:  A Philosophical Approach, 33 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 887, 906 
(2001) (discussing how the moral authority upon which scientific evidence is based must 
include the implications of justice and truth seeking).  Thus, with the SSA disability 
adjudication process, “[j]ustice cannot be achieved without the presumption that the legal 
process is ‘finding’ truth[.]”  Mason, supra, at 906. 
2 DAVID F. TRAVER, SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY ADVOCATE’S HANDBOOK § 1400 (2006).  
The “SSA’s reliance upon the underlying assumption and the data of the DOT . . . is the 
keystone in the arch which holds up . . . the entire vocational framework at the Social 
Security Administration.”  Id. (emphasis added).  Interestingly, “the DOT has never been 
reliable” and is merely “a job placement tool that, at its margins, has masqueraded as 
reliable vocational evidence.”  Id. (emphasis added).  Thus, shockingly, “the DOT and its 
underlying assumptions [remain] . . . fundamental to the determination of the outcome in 
millions of disability claims annually.”  Id. (emphasis added).  See also Richardson v. 
Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 413 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (stating that “when a grave 
injustice is wreaked on an individual by the presently powerful federal bureaucracy, it is a 
matter of concern to everyone[]”); TRAVER, supra,  § 1700 (stating that “[t]he end-point of 
most disability claims that are adjudicated at the SSA are resolved for better or worse at 
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the whole SSA system is built.3  When the integrity of the foundation is 
compromised, the entire system becomes unstable.4  Thus, it follows that 
because the validity of VE testimony has been compromised, the entire 
SSA disability determination process is susceptible to collapse.5 
As the largest system of administrative adjudication in the western 
world, the SSA has drastically experienced an increase in the number of 
claims filed each year.6  Consequently, with an adjudication system this 
large, it is only natural that Congress requires the federal judiciary to 
ensure the SSA affords disability claimants a certain level of fairness and 
decide cases correctly.7  Yet, multiple aspects of federal judicial disability 
                                                                                                             
step five of the sequential evaluation process[]”); MILLS, supra note 1, at 111 (explaining that 
a VE’s presence at a hearing can make or break the case for a claimant). 
3 MILLS, supra note 1, at 111.  The VE relies upon The Dictionary of Occupational Titles 
(“DOT”) to reach conclusions because the disability adjudication process’s reliance upon 
the VE and the DOT are firmly embedded in the SSA’s Regulations and Rulings.  See Social 
Security Ruling 82–61 (Aug. 20, 1980), available at http://www.ssa.gov/OP_Home/ 
rulings/di/02/SSR82-61-di-02.html (discussing the authority of the DOT and the necessity 
of calling a VE to testify); see also S.S.R. 00-4p (Dec. 4, 2000), available at 
www.ssa.gov/OP_Home/rulings/di/02/SSR2000-04-di-02.html (discussing the use of a 
VE and other occupational information in disability decisions). 
4 TRAVER, supra note 2,  § 1302.  Before the use of VEs may be permitted in SSA 
hearings, the SSA must have a “rational decision” regarding vocational issues.  Id. (citing 
Kerner v. Flemming, 283 F.2d 916, 921 (2d Cir. 1960)).  Although the SSA attempted to 
address this issue by relying upon “selected government and industrial studies[,]” the 
courts eventually rejected that approach because the reports were “speculative and 
theoretical in determining whether there were employment opportunities available to 
disability claimants . . . .”  Id.  To address this issue that put the system on the brink of 
collapse, the SSA “decided to employ vocational experts . . .  [who] would address their 
testimony to the claimant’s particular and highly individual situation in an effort to satisfy 
the Kerner criteria.”  Id. (citing SSA History of SSA During the Johnson Administration 
1963–1968, available at http://www.ssa.gov/history/ssa/lbjoper5.html (discussing the 
history leading up to the implementation of VEs within SSA disability hearings and why 
there is a need for reliable vocational evidence)). 
5 TRAVER, supra note 2, § 1900 (stating that “[a]fter all of those years and all of those 
hearings, such an attorney has no way of knowing if the VEs gave honest and accurate 
answers, or if the testimony was made up out of whole cloth[]”); see also Richardson v. 
Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 413 (1971) (Douglas, J. dissenting) (stating that the “[r]eview of the 
evidence is of no value to us[] [because] [t]he vice is in the procedure which allows it in 
without testing it . . . . ”). 
6 See MARGARET C. JASPER, SOCIAL SECURITY LAW 7 (2004) (stating that “[a]s of 2003, 
approximately 7,595,452 disabled workers and their dependents were receiving 
benefits[]”); Jianting Hu et al., A Structural Model of Social Security’s Disability Determination 
Process 1 (Office of Research, Evaluation, and Statistics, Working Paper No. 72, 1997), 
available at http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/workingpapers/wp72.pdf (stating that with 
the SSA accepting 2.5 million applications a year, “its budgetary and welfare implications 
are undeniable[]”). 
7 See TRAVER, supra note 2, § 1302 (discussing how in Kerner v. Flemming, 283 F.2d 916, 
921 (2d Cir. 1960), the issue of why the SSA needed substantial vocational evidence was 
addressed for the first time); Larry M. Gropman, Social Security, 1996 DET. C.L. REV. 517, 
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proceedings are flawed; specifically, the way in which VE testimony is 
evaluated is problematic.8 
The integrity of VE testimony has been compromised for several 
reasons, including the fact that “[t]here presently are no standards to 
become a vocational expert, no training, no supervision, and no 
credential requirements.”9  Additionally, the vocational field is a 
relatively new discipline and the methodology invoked by VEs in 
analyzing DOT data and vocational information of a disability claimant 
is not an exact science.10  In fact, the point at which a scientific principle 
crosses the line from experimental to demonstrable is often debated.11  
Still, the SSA “figures [that] the DOT and its related data are ‘better than 
nothing.’  But ‘better than nothing’ is not a reliable basis [from which] to 
award and deny critical life-sustaining benefits to the disabled and 
                                                                                                             
518 (1996) (discussing the importance of providing a judicial check on an unavoidably 
bureaucratic and budget conscious system).  But see Moyer v. Peabody, 212 U.S. 78, 84 
(1909) (“[W]hat is due process of law depends on [the] circumstances.  It varies with the 
subject-matter and the necessities of the situation.”). 
8 See JEFFREY SCOTT WOLFE & LISA B. POSZEK, SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY AND THE 
LEGAL PROFESSIONAL 260 (2003) (discussing specific issues that warrant review including:  
the ALJ erred; the record as a whole did not support the ALJ’s decision; the ALJ was 
biased; the ALJ disregarded applicable Social Security rulings; or due process was not 
followed).  See also MILLS, supra note 1, at 57.  “In general, when abuse of discretion was 
detected, . . . [one of the] primary explanations[] . . . [was that] vocational testimony was 
either inadequate or misrepresented” during the course of the hearing.  Id.  Other reversible 
errors occurred when the ALJ’s questioning of VEs during the hearing was flawed.  Id. at 
58. 
9 TRAVER, supra note 2, § 1302.  But see Daniel F. Solomon, Vocational Testimony in Social 
Security Hearings, 18 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDGES, 197, 209 (1998) (explaining that under 
the SSA’s guidelines found in HALLEX, the ALJ is required to administer an oath; qualify 
the VE by ensuring impartiality, expertise, and professional qualifications; ask the claimant 
if there are any objections to the VE testifying; and finally, rule on any objections).  In 
addition to the lack of standards for VEs, the VE testimony lacks validity because it is 
based on the outdated DOT, and thus the system fails because the real world changes and 
the DOT data does not keep pace.  TRAVER, supra note 2, § 1403.1; see also WOLFE & POSZEK, 
supra note 8, at 7 (discussing the Hearings, Appeals and Litigation law Manual (HALLEX), 
which is a two-volume manual that provides procedures for carrying out administration 
policies, and guidance for processing and adjudicating claims at the SSA). 
10 See “The American Board of Vocational Experts’ Overview Page,” 
http://www.abve.net/overview.htm (stating that the American Board of Vocational 
Experts, which represents both the private and the public sectors, was founded in 1980 to 
preserve the integrity, standards, ethics, and uniqueness of vocational experts); see also 
TRAVER, supra note 2, § 1403.1 (stating that comprehending the vastness of employment 
data requires a taxonomy, i.e., a classification system, but this system is insufficient because 
of the inability of VEs to accurately base the claimant’s vocational history with outdated 
data from the DOT). 
11 Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923) (discussing the important role 
that expert testimony plays in the judicial process); see infra note 109 and accompanying 
text (discussing in detail the implications of the Frye holding). 
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disadvantaged.”12  It is someplace within “this twilight zone [that] the 
evidentia[ry] force of . . . [a scientific] principle must be recognized, and 
while courts will go a long way in admitting expert testimony[,] . . . the 
thing from which [a] deduction is made must be sufficiently established 
to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it 
belongs.”13 
This Note discusses ways in which the SSA can avoid the 
disintegration of the disability determination process by protecting the 
integrity of disability proceedings and assuring claimants are afforded 
an adequate level of fairness.  Part II of this Note discusses the SSA 
system, namely the aspects of disability hearings, the role of VEs within 
these hearings, and the evidentiary standards implemented pre- and 
post-Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.14  Part III explains the 
extent to which the SSA relies on the testimony of VEs and discusses 
Social Security enactments, such as Social Security Ruling 00-4p (“S.S.R. 
00-4p”), which were implemented to ensure fairness in disability 
proceedings; Part III also analyzes the possibility of implementing a 
Daubert-type standard to evaluate VE testimony to ensure that a 
disability claimant is afforded an adequate level of fairness.15  Finally, 
Part IV proposes a solution in the form of a model Rule to resolve these 
issues.16 
II.  BACKGROUND 
The SSA is a large and intricate adjudication system that is 
constantly evolving.17  This Part discusses the historical development, 
                                                 
12 TRAVER, supra note 2, §1400.  “Traditionally slow to act in the face of change, [the] SSA 
so far has published no regulations to bridge the divide between” the obsolete DOT and its 
methodology and new and updated occupational sources.  Id. § 1503.  See also JASPER, supra 
note 6, at 7 (discussing the immense effect that disability benefits have on people’s lives 
and that “[a]lmost 3 in 10 of today’s 20 year-olds will become disabled before reaching age 
67[]”); Claire R. Kelly, The Dangers of Daubert Creep in the Regulatory Realm, 26 J. NAT’L ASS’N 
ADMIN. L. JUDGES 469, 471 (2006) (discussing the situations in which a standard needs to be 
implemented to ensure that federal agencies are relying upon acceptable evidence to base 
conclusions); infra note 74 and accompanying text (discussing the outdated methodology of 
the DOT and the updated occupational source O*NET). 
13 Frye, 293 F. at 1014 (discussing the need for expert testimony to be based on a solid 
foundation that is generally accepted in the particular field in question). 
14 See infra notes 17–139 and accompanying text. 
15 See infra notes 141–212 and accompanying text. 
16 See infra notes 214–38 and accompanying text. 
17 For the disability claimant who has filed an appeal and requested a hearing in front of 
an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”), the SSA will assign a hearing date at which the 
claimant will have his chance in front of an ALJ at the SSA Office of Disability Adjudication 
and Review (“ODAR”).  See WOLFE & POSZEK, supra note 8, at 247.  Upon entering the 
hearing room, the claimant will be greeted by the ALJ who will provide an introductory 
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functional aspects, and policy objectives of the SSA system.18  First, Part 
II.A provides an overview of the Social Security Disability Insurance 
Benefits (“DIB”) program.19  Next, Part II.B discusses the functional 
aspects of the SSA’s disability hearings—namely, the five-step sequential 
disability determination process.20  Part II.C discusses the policy 
objectives of the SSA (regarding VEs), the DOT, and other occupational 
sources used to support VE testimony.21  Last, Part II.D addresses pre- 
and post-Daubert evidentiary approaches, and policies that the SSA has 
introduced since Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.22  
A. Overview of the Social Security Disability Insurance Program 
The SSA, with the authority granted to it by the Social Security Act,23 
provides cash and insurance benefits24 to individuals through two 
                                                                                                             
statement explaining the nature of the hearing and stating the issues to be addressed.  Id.  If 
there are any exhibits not already submitted into the administrative record, the claimant 
will have a chance to submit them to the ALJ, who will mark them and make each a part of 
the record.  Id.  If the claimant is represented by counsel, he or she will make an opening 
statement to the ALJ which frames the contours of the case and explains the theory of the 
claim.  Id. at 248.  The next part of the hearing consists of the ALJ or the claimant’s counsel 
asking the claimant a series of questions outlining the claimant’s impairments, limitations, 
and daily activities.  Id.  If the claimant brings other witnesses, such as a significant other or 
a family member, the ALJ will question those witnesses about the claimant’s condition and 
limitations.  Id.  Next, the ALJ will examine the medical expert, making a general inquiry 
about the claimant’s documented impairment(s) and elicit the expert’s opinion concerning 
whether a listing is met.  Id.  Subsequently, the ALJ will examine the VE, “eliciting the 
expert’s opinion about the nature of the claimant’s past relevant work, specifying exertion 
and skill level; followed by an inquiry about transferable skills; and ending in a series of 
hypothetical questions in which various limitations are expressed as part of the claimant’s 
(hypothetical) residual functional capacity.”  Id.  Last, the closing argument is presented, or 
if the claimant does not have an attorney, the ALJ will ask if the claimant has anything 
more that the ALJ should know before the ALJ makes a decision.  Id. 
18 See infra Part II. 
19 See infra Part II.A. 
20 See infra Part II.B. 
21 See infra Part II.C. 
22 509 U.S. 579 (1993); see infra Part II.D. 
23 See generally 42 U.S.C. § 423 (2000) (discussing the purpose and scope of the Social 
Security Act). 
24 Jae Kennedy & Marjorie F. Olney, Factors Associated with Workforce Participation 
Amount SSDI, 72 J. REHAB. 4 (2006) (stating that “[t]he Social Security Disability Insurance 
. . . program provides cash benefits and health insurance to approximately 6.8 million 
disabled workers and their families, at a total annual cost of about $66 billion[]”).  
Incentives for applying for these benefits have been drastically affected by changes in 
institutional, economic, and demographic factors.  See Hu et al., supra note 6, at 2.  An 
example of institutional factors is reductions in state programs assisting the impaired, thus 
shifting the reliance from state agencies to the SSA.  Id.  Examples of economic and 
demographic factors include an aging population, the rise in unemployment, a reduction in 
the number of blue collar jobs, and the loss of health coverage for workers and their 
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disability programs, both of which use the same disability determination 
process, but both of which also have different, yet complementary, 
goals.25  The first program is the Social Security DIB program, which is 
part of the comprehensive social security insurance program,26 and the 
second program is the Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”)27 program, 
                                                                                                             
families.  Id.  The application process consists of:  (1) submitting an application to a Social 
Security Administration District Office; (2) the District Office Representative (“Rep”) being 
assigned the case and scheduling an initial interview with the claimant; (3) the Rep, in the 
initial interview, checking the claimant’s non-medical criteria to ensure that the claimant is 
below the full retirement age, has worked in at least five of the ten most recent years, and is 
not currently engaged in substantial gainful activity; (4) if the claimant meets the non-
medical criteria, the application is forwarded to one of the Disability Determination 
Services office (“DDS”) where medical examiners scrutinize medical evidence from one or 
more of the claimant’s health care providers regarding the claimant’s capability of 
performing employment; (5) if deemed necessary, the DDS will order that the claimant 
undergo a consultative examination; and (6) if the DDS is able to find the claimant has an 
impairment that meets or equals a Medical Listing, then the claimant is entitled to benefits.  
WOLFE & PROSZEK, supra note 8, at 3–5.  If the DDS denies the claimant’s application for 
disability benefits, the claimant has several options, such as, the claimant can request:  (1) a 
reconsideration by a different team at the DDS; (2) a hearing in front of an Administrative 
Law Judge; or (3) an appeal to the Social Security’s Appeal Council.  Id.  The Social Security 
Act mandates that each Social Security claimant exhaust his administrative remedies before 
appealing to a federal district court.  42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (2000). 
25 See Hu et al., supra note 6, at 11; see also David H. Autor and Mark G. Duggan, The Rise 
in Disability Recipiency and the Decline in Unemployment 4 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, 
Working Paper No. 8336, 2006), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w8336 (stating 
that the medical eligibility criteria for the two programs are identical). 
26 MILLS, supra note 1, at 2.  The DIB social insurance program is authorized under Title 
II of the Act and is called the Old Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance (OASDI) 
program.  See Hu et al., supra note 6, at 5.  This program is funded through payroll tax 
contributions allocated to the Disability Insurance Trust Fund.  Id.  The types of Title II 
Benefits include retirement Insurance Benefits (20 C.F.R. § 404.310), Survivors’ Insurance 
Benefits, and Disability Insurance Benefits (20 C.F.R. § 404.315).  Survivors’ Insurance 
Benefits include the following:  Spouses and Divorced Spouses (20 C.F.R. § 404.330); 
Child’s Benefits (20 C.F.R. § 404.350); Parent’s Benefits (20 C.F.R. § 404.370); Special 
Payments at Age 72 (20 C.F.R. § 404.380); and Lump-Sum Death Payment (20 C.F.R. 
§ 404.390).  20 C.F.R. § 404.301 (2006).  Entitlement factors for Disability Insurance Benefits 
are defined under 20 C.F.R. § 404.315 and require the following:  (1) that the claimant be 
under 65 years of age; (2) that the claimant file an application; (3) that the claimant satisfies 
the disability insurance requirements located under 20 C.F.R. § 404.130; (4) that the 
claimant is disabled as defined by the Act; and (5) that the claimant completed the five full 
calendar months waiting period.  See 20 C.F.R. § 404.130 (2006).  
27 MILLS, supra note 1, at 2.  Authorized under Title XVI of the Act, the Supplemental 
Security Income (SSI) provides for disabled individuals who fail to meet the insured status 
requirement: 
(1) Every individual who— 
(A) is insured for disability insurance benefits (as determined under 
subsection (c)(1) of this section), 
(B) has not attained retirement age (as defined in section 416(l) of this 
title), 
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which is a means-based program designed specifically to guarantee a 
minimal level of income to only the poorest of the aged, blind, and 
disabled.28  Because SSI benefits are means-based29 and consist of only 
nine-percent30 of the benefits paid by the SSA, this Note focuses on DIB.31 
                                                                                                             
(C) if not a United States citizen or national— 
(i) has been assigned a social security account number that was, at the 
time of assignment, or at any later time, consistent with the 
requirements of subclause (I) or (III) of section 405(c)(2)(B)(i) of this 
title; or 
(ii) at the time any quarters of coverage are earned— 
(I)is described in subparagraph (B) or (D) of section 1101(a)(15) of Title 
8, 
(II) is lawfully admitted temporarily to the United States for business 
(in the case of an individual described in such subparagraph (B)) or the 
performance as a crewman (in the case of an individual described in 
such subparagraph (D)), and 
(III) the business engaged in or service as a crewman performed is 
within the scope of the terms of such individual's admission to the 
United States. 
(D) has filed application for disability insurance benefits, and 
(E) is under a disability (as defined in subsection (d) of this section), 
shall be entitled to a disability insurance benefit . . . . 
42 U.S.C. § 423(a)(1) (2000).  In 1974, under President Richard Nixon, the SSI program was 
introduced and targeted individuals who had limited income and were disabled.  See John 
R. Kearney, Social Security and the “D” in OASDI:  The History of a Federal Program Insuring 
Earners Against Disability, 66 SOC. SEC. BULL. 3, 1 (2005–2006).  See Social Security 
Administration’s SSI Page, http://www.socialsecurity.gov/notices/supplemental-
security-income.  Unlike the Disability Insurance Benefits, the SSI benefits are not based on 
prior work, and are financed by general funds of the U.S. Treasury.  Id. 
28 See Hu et al., supra note 6, at 1; see also WOLFE & POSZEK, supra note 8, at 40 (explaining 
that the SSI program is basically a type of welfare program). 
29 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381–1383f (2000).  The Act provides supplemental security income for 
disabled individuals who fail to meet the insured status requirement.  Id.; see also Autor, 
supra note 25, at 4 (stating that SSI benefits are means-tested and thus, there is no 
requirement that the claimant have any prior work history); WOLFE & POSZEK, supra note 8, 
at 40 (explaining that the SSI program is not based on a past history of employment like the 
DIB program, from which payment into a trust fund creates an insured status). 
30 See WOLFE & POSZEK, supra note 8, at 41.  In July 2000, 6.5 million recipients received 
SSI payments with the average monthly benefit of approximately $377.  Id.  This accounted 
for roughly nine-percent of the benefits paid out by the SSA, and is significantly less than 
the 86% of benefits paid out through the DIB program.  Id.; see also JASPER, supra note 6, at 7 
(stating that “[t]he passage of the Contract with American Advancement Act of 1996 
narrowed the number of people allowed to receive SSI disability benefits by requiring that 
drug addiction or alcoholism not be a material factor in their disability[]”). 
31 A historical overview of the Disability Insurance program reveals that in 1954 the SSA 
instituted the disability “freeze” which limited eligibility to persons disabled for at least six 
months and whose earnings history proved a solid connection to the workforce.  See 
Kearney, supra note 27, at 1.  Disability determinations were made by the states and 
reimbursed through the Social Security trust fund.  Id.  It was in 1956 that monthly benefits 
began to be provided to disabled workers aged 50–64.  Id.  Two years later in 1958, benefits 
were established for the dependents of disabled workers.  Id.  In 1960, the harsh 
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To be eligible for DIB, the SSA requires that an applicant be unable 
to engage in “substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically 
determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to 
result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a 
continuous period of not less than twelve months.”32  To make this 
disability determination, and in an attempt to balance the need for 
efficiency with the need of ensuring that a claimant is treated fairly, the 
SSA adopted a subjective, five-step sequential process that considers the 
uniqueness of a claimant’s impairment or impairments.33 
                                                                                                             
requirement that a worker be at least 50 years old to be eligible for disability benefits was 
eliminated.  Id.  Subsequently, in 1972 Medicare coverage was extended to Disability 
Insurance beneficiaries after two years of entitlement.  Id.  In 1980, a cap was placed on 
family benefits to disabled workers and periodic disability reviews were enacted, as well as 
return-to-work incentives.  Id.  Subsequently in 1984, Congress addressed the issue of 
mental related disabilities by implementing new criteria for adjudication of claims 
involving mental impairments.  Id.  The new criteria greatly liberalized the disability 
screening process by making disability benefits significantly more attainable to employees 
with less severely disabling impairments, such as cognitive disorders and degenerative 
musculoskeletal ailments.  See Hu et al., supra note 6, at 1.  Consequently, the 
implementation of the new criteria broadened the previously narrowly defined disability 
insurance benefits program to allow for an expanded population with a more subjectively 
defined entitlement to disability insurance benefits.  Id. at 2.  The changes to the eligibility 
requirements occurred as a result of actions taken by Congress and the courts.  Id. 
32 20 C.F.R. § 404.1505 (2006).  The Social Security Act’s definition of disability has three 
separate components:  (1) the severity requirement (the inability to engage in any 
substantial gainful activity); (2) the origin requirement (the disability must be based on a 
medically determinable physical or mental impairment); and (3) the duration requirement 
(qualifying impairment must last at least one year or be expected to result in death).  Social 
Security Act § 223(d)(2)(A).  See also Frank S. Bloch et al., Developing a Full and Evidentiary 
Record in a Nonadversary Setting:  Two Proposals for Improving Social Security Disability 
Adjudications, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 17 (2003) (explaining that the three requirements must 
be met; for example, a short-term disability, no matter how severe, is not sufficient to 
establish eligibility under the Social Security Act).  See also Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212 
(2002).  In Walton, the claimant (Walton) challenged the Social Security Administration’s 
determination that he was not entitled to disability benefits as a result of returning to part-
time work eleven months after losing his full-time teaching job due to his serious cognitive 
impairment.  Id. at 1267.  The claimant argued that the SSA’s interpretation of the statute’s 
qualifications was unlawful.  Id. at 1265.  The Supreme Court started by addressing the 
issue of whether or not the regulation of the durational requirement of the provision was 
unlawful.  Id.  The Court determined that the provision made no explicit statements about 
the duration of the claimant’s inability.  Id.  The statute did not unambiguously forbid the 
SSA regulation.  Id.  Then, the Court considered the construction of the statute and 
determined that there was no infringement.  Id.  The Court concluded that the SSA’s 
interpretation was in line with the statute’s basic objectives, which necessitated some 
durational requirement.  Id.  Consequently, the Court found that the interpretation did not 
contradict the SSA’s own precedent regarding interpretation.  Id.  The Court held that the 
SSA regulation was lawful and that the regulation of the duration provision was a 
reasonable interpretation of the statute.  Id. 
33 S.S.R. 03-3p (Nov. 10, 2003), available at http://www.ssa.gov/OP_Home/rulings/di/ 
01/SSR2003-03-di-01.html (discussing the purpose of Social Security Ruling 03-3p).  It is 
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B. Functional Aspects of Social Security Hearings:  The First Three Steps of 
the Five-Step Sequential Disability Determination Process 
Like most valid and recognized adjudication systems, the SSA’s five-
step disability determination process is based on the notion of 
fundamental fairness.34  Understanding how the five-step process works 
is crucial; accordingly, two key concepts should be realized:  first, the 
analysis is sequential, meaning that the claimant cannot proceed from 
one step to another until it is determined that he is didsabled; and 
second, the analysis is a process, meaning that it requires consideration 
of many elements, consisting of both medical and vocational evidence.35 
In order for the process to begin, a claimant must first be eligible.36  If 
a claimant is rendered unable to continue employment at any time 
before age sixty-five, the claimant may be eligible for DIB as long as the 
claimant meets the SSA’s standard for disability and is “deemed 
‘insured’ because [the claimant has] worked the required number of 
quarters for a person [of her] age and has contributed to the [SSA] 
system.”37 
                                                                                                             
important to realize that in the sequential evaluation process there are limited 
opportunities for a claimant to be granted benefits.  See WOLFE & POSZEK, supra note 8, at 
248.  The claimant can be granted benefits at step three, e.g., the claimant meets or 
medically equals a medical listing.  Id.  The claimant can also be granted benefits at step-
five, e.g., the claimant satisfies the requisite criteria for a disability award based on the 
Medical-Vocational Guidelines (“Grids”).  Id.  Last, the claimant can be granted benefits at 
the second part of step five, e.g., the claimant is awarded disability benefits using the Grids 
as a framework and the VE testifying that there are no jobs that exist in significant numbers 
which the claimant can maintain.  Id. 
34 See supra note 1 and accompanying text (discussing the notion of fairness and justice 
within the adjudication system).  See also WOLFE & POSZEK, supra note 8, at 50 (discussing 
the underlying notion of fairness and justice that support the five-step framework).  
Disability hearings before ALJs are governed by the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 
which governs the on the record adjudications.  Id. at 244.  These on the record hearings are 
like regular judicial hearings in that they are recorded verbatim.  Id.  The record is crucial 
for organization, and serves as an invaluable tool for the claimant’s attorney if the hearing 
is not successful because the hearing record contains enumerated exhibits, all of which 
constitute the record on which the decision was made.  Thus, filing an appeal is easier 
because all of the exhibits and transcripts are available and may be thoroughly examined 
for any errors made during the hearing.  Id.  
35 WOLFE & POSZEK, supra note 8, at 50.  Not surprisingly, the sequential evaluation 
process is founded on the same public policy argument that supports the Social Security 
Act, namely, that if an employee is unable to maintain a minimum level of personal 
sustenance, society has deemed it necessary to offer resources so that the employee does 
not suffer.  Id. 
36 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A) (2000) (explaining the requirement that 
the claimant is no longer able to work due to health reasons can be expected to last for a 
continuous period of not less thantwelve months). 
37 JASPER, supra note 6, at 41–42 (discussing how the claimant must be first eligible to 
apply before the disability determination process starts). 
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Once the applicant is deemed eligible, the SSA next determines 
whether the applicant is disabled under the five-step sequential 
evaluation process.38  The first of the five-step sequential evaluation 
process is to determine whether the individual is engaged in substantial 
gainful activity (“SGA”).39  If the individual is working and the work 
meets the criteria of SGA, then the individual is not disabled and the 
                                                 
38 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520 (2006).  The ALJ must sequentially follow the five-step evaluation 
process.  Id.  Thus, if the ALJ can find that the claimant is disabled or not disabled by 
application of a specific step, the ALJ makes his or her determination or decision and does 
not go on to subsequent steps.  20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(4) (2006).  As mentioned in note 6, the 
concept of disability is subjective, so without an objective standard as to who is determined 
to be disabled can vary widely among individuals.  See WOLFE & POSZEK, supra note 8, at 
50.  The legislature’s solution was “a legal standard which takes into account both medical 
and vocational issues, founded on the premises that disability in American society is 
grounded in an ability to maintain a minimum level of sustenance through one’s own 
efforts.”  Id. at 50.  See also JASPER, supra note 6, at 43 (stating that “[q]ualifying disabilities 
are usually determined by a state agency that handles health issues—generally known as a 
disability determination service—which must find that the individual is suffering from a 
physical or mental impairment that meets SSA criteria[]”). 
39 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(i).  Regulations define “substantial gainful activity” as “work that 
[] (a) [i]nvolves doing significant and productive physical or mental duties; and (b) [i]s 
done (or intended) for pay or profit.”  Id. § 404.1510 (2006).  Thus, the definition of SGA 
consists of work activity that is both (1) substantial and (2) gainful.  Id.  See also 20 C.F.R. 
§ 404.1572 (2006) (stating that substantial work involves doing significant physical and or 
mental activities with reasonable regularity, e.g., work cannot be sporadic or transitory, 
and also that gainful work is work activity done for pay or profit).  This regulation states 
that any monthly income below three-hundred dollars does not rise to the level of SGA.  Id. 
§ 404.1574(b)(3).  However, any monthly income that exceeds three-hundred dollars, but is 
below seven-hundred and eighty dollars, will prompt a review by the SSA in order to 
determine whether the applicant is engaging in SGA.  Id.  This review process will 
determine whether the applicant’s work is comparable to that of unimpaired individuals in 
the community doing the same or similar work, including similar time, skills, energy, and 
responsibility.  See WOLFE & POSZEK, supra note 8, at 64.  Then, the review process will 
determine whether the work, though significantly less than that done by unimpaired 
individuals, worth the amount presumed to be consistent with the SGA amount of seven-
hundred and eighty dollars.  Id.  In other words, the SSA determines whether the 
applicant’s monthly income is subsidized because, even though the applicant is working, 
the work is at a substandard level and the employer continues to employ the applicant 
even though the work product is substandard to that of an average employee.  See THOMAS 
E. BUSH, SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY PRACTICE §113 (2006) (stating that “[w]ork may not be 
substantial when a claimant is unable ‘to do ordinary . . . tasks satisfactorily without 
more . . . assistance than is usually given other people doing similar work’ or when a 
claimant is doing work ‘that involves minimal duties . . . that are of ‘little . . . use’ to the 
employer . . . .”) (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 404.1573(b)).  After 2001, the SSA adopted a policy 
declaring that the amount of income that qualifies as gainful activity is adjusted for growth 
in national wages.  20 C.F.R. § 404.1574(b)(2)(ii).  The average monthly earnings in 2004 
were eight-hundred and ten dollars.  See BUSH, supra, § 113. 
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determination process ceases; however, if the claimant meets the SGA 
requirement, then the process continues.40   
The second step is to determine whether the individual has an 
impairment, or combination of impairments, that is severe.41  If the 
individual does not have an impairment, or combination of impairments, 
that is severe, the SSA finds the individual not disabled, and the 
determination process ceases.42 
                                                 
40 See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1572 (2006).  If the claimant is actually working at a certain level of 
earnings at the applicable time, the claimant is not disabled, regardless of the claimant’s 
medical severity.  Id. § 404.1520(b).  In Markham v. Califano, 601 F.2d 533 (10th Cir. 1979), the 
court determined that SGA was employment performed on a regular basis.  Id. at 534.  The 
court further determined that intermittent employment does not necessarily constitute 
SGA, and the SSA should review medical testimony to determine if such an intermittent 
employee qualifies for disability benefits.  Id. 
41 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(ii).  If the claimant does not have a severe medically determinable 
physical or mental impairment that meets the duration requirement in § 404.1509, or a 
combination of impairments that is severe and meets the duration requirement, the SSA 
will find that the disability claimant not disabled.  Id.  The duration of the impairment 
needs to have lasted or expected to last for a continuous period of at leasttwelvemonths.  
See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1509 (2006).  The word ‘severe’ is a term of art, and its definition is found 
in § 223(d)(3) of the Social Security Act and also in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c).  There is a two-
fold process in determining the existence of a severe impairment:  (1) A medically 
determinable impairment which is (2) more than a slight abnormality and has more than a 
minimal effect on the ability to do basic physical or mental work activities.  See S.S.R. 96-3p 
(July 2, 1996).  Medically determinable means the result of anatomical, physiological or 
psychological abnormalities which can be shown by medically acceptable clinical or 
laboratory diagnostic techniques.  See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1508 (2006); see also S.S.R. 96-3p (July 
2, 1996) (stating that a severe impairment is an impairment or combination of impairments 
which significantly limits the physical or mental ability to do basic work-related activities).  
The combined effect of all impairments must be assessed without regard to whether any 
single impairment, if considered separately, would be severe in determining if a severe 
impairment exists.  See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1523 (2006).  A severe impairment should be 
determined to exist when there are multiple impairments that, considered in combination, 
have more than a minimal effect on the ability to perform basic work-related activities.  See 
S.S.R. 86-8 (Nov. 30, 1985).  The issue of tacking arises when there are unrelated severe 
impairments that develop sequentially, one following the other or with some overlap, and 
at least one impairment must alone meet the duration requirement.  See 20 C.F.R. 
§ 404.1522(a) (2006).  Also, such impairments cannot be combined to meet the duration 
requirement, even though the impairments together have met or are expected to last for 
twelve months.  See S.S.R. 82-52 (Nov. 30, 1981); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1522(b) (2006) 
(stating that where severity is established only because concurrent impairments are severe 
when considered in combination, i.e., no single impairment is severe in and of itself, the 
combination must be expected to persist at a severe level for twelve months in order to 
meet the duration requirement). 
42 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c) (2006).  The SSA has defined a severe impairment as an 
impairment that significantly limits a claimant’s mental or physical ability to perform basic 
work activities.  Id.  “The standard for assessing ‘severity’ at step 2 is medical only.  
Vocational factors, such as age, education, and past work history, are considered at this 
step, but they are more important at step 5 of the sequential evaluation process.”  WOLFE & 
POSZEK, supra note 8, at 74; see also S.S.R. 96-3p (July 2, 1996) (stating that the ALJ is 
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The third step is to determine whether the individual’s impairment 
meets the severity of an impairment listed43 in the Social Security 
Regulations.44  If it does, the individual is deemed disabled.45  If it does 
not, the SSA proceeds to step four, which is to determine whether the 
individual’s impairment(s) prevent(s) her from doing her past relevant 
                                                                                                             
required to evaluate a claimant’s impairment to assess the impairment’s effect on the 
claimant’s performance of basic work activities and that in situations when the effect of an 
impairment on the claimant’s ability to perform work activities is indeterminable, the ALJ 
should presume that a severe impairment exists and proceed to step three). 
43 See 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, App. 1 (2006).  Appendix 1 of subpart P of part 404 is 
the body system listing and consists of the following sections:  1.00 Musculoskeletal 
System; 2.00 Special Senses and Speech; 3.00 Respiratory System; 4.00 Cardiovascular 
System; 5.00 Digestive System; 6.00 Genitourinary Impairments; 7.00 Hematological 
Disorders; 8.00 Skin Disorders; 9.00 Endocrine System; 10.00 Impairments That Affect 
Multiple Body Systems; 11.00 Neurological; 12.00 Mental Disorders; 13.00 Malignant 
Neoplastic Diseases; and 14.00 Immune System.  Id.  If the DIB claimant’s impairment 
meets or equals one of the above listings, then the Agency will halt the process at Step 3 
and find that the claimant is disabled.  Id. 
44 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(iii) (2006).  If the disability claimant has an impairment that meets 
the duration requirement and is listed in appendix 1 or is the equivalent of a listed 
impairment, the SSA will find the claimant disabled without considering the claimant’s 
age, education, and work experience  Id. § 404.1520(d) (2006).  However, if a person has a 
severe, medically determinable impairment which, though not meeting or equaling the 
criteria in the Listing of Impairments, prevents the person from doing PRW, it must be 
determined whether the person can do other work.  Id.  This involves consideration of the 
person’s RFC and the vocational factors of age, education, and work experience.  Id.  See 
generally S.S.R. 85-15 (Nov. 30, 1984) (discussing the transition between steps 3 and step 4). 
45 WOLFE & POSZEK, supra note 8, at 91 (discussing the additional step in the five-step 
sequential evaluation process).  The five-step sequential process arguably has six steps 
because before proceeding to step four, the ALJ must establish the claimant’s residual 
functional capacity (RFC).  See Hu et al., supra note 6, at 8 (stating that step four consists of 
two determinations).  A claimant’s RFC is based on that individual’s physical and mental 
limitations and measures how the limitations affect the claimant’s ability to work, and it 
serves as an evaluation of what the claimant can still do despite his or her limitations.  See 
20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a) (2006).  The RFC assessment is used at the fourth step to determine if 
the individual can do past relevant work.  See id. at §404.1520(e).  See also WOLFE & POSZEK, 
supra note 8, at 91 (stating that before the analysis under step four can be completed, the 
RFC needs to be assigned at “step Three-and-a-Half of the five-step sequential evaluation 
process[]”).  Establishing the claimant’s RFC is completed by reviewing the claimant’s 
medical records and then comparing the claimant’s limitations to one of five categories of 
exertion-type work activity located in the DOT.  Id. at 92.  The five categories are as follows:  
(1) Sedentary work; (2) Light work; (3) Medium work; (4) Heavy work; and (5) Very heavy 
work.  Id.  The ALJ gauges the claimant’s ability to engage in various activities, classified as 
exertional or non-exertional.  Id. at 51.  The claimant’s functional capability varies, 
depending on the inability to engage in specified exertion-type or non-exertion-type 
activities.  Id. at 92.  “It is this variation, and the absence of a specific capability, or 
limitation, that ultimately defines the individual’s capacity for different work categories 
. . . .”  Id. at 51.  Thus, once the claimant is assigned a residual functional capacity, the issue 
becomes whether the individual’s employment within the previous fifteen years can still be 
completed.  Id. at 52. 
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work (“PRW”), considering her residual functional capacity (“RFC”).46  If 
the individual’s impairment(s) prevent(s) her from doing her PRW, the 
SSA proceeds to the last of the five-step process.47   
In this last step, the SSA determines whether a significant number of 
jobs that the individual is able to perform exists in the national economy, 
considering her RFC together with the vocational factors of age, 
education, and work experience.48  If a significant number of jobs that the 
individual can perform exists in the national economy, the SSA finds that 
                                                 
46 See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1560(1) (2006) (stating that past relevant work is employment that 
an individual completed within the past fifteen years, was classified as substantial gainful 
activity, and lasted long enough for the individual to learn how to complete the tasks); see 
also S.S.R. 82-62 (Nov. 30, 1981) (stating that the employment must have been done for a 
sufficient length of time to learn and provide average performance).  The Code requires 
that if the impairment does not match a listing in the Social Security Regulations, then the 
ALJ shall assess and make a finding about the claimant’s residual functional capacity based 
on all the relevant medical evidence and other evidence in the claimant’s case record.  20 
C.F.R. § 404.1520(e) (2006).  The individual’s impairment and any related symptoms, such 
as pain, may cause physical and mental limitations that affect what the individual can 
accomplish in their employment setting; thus, the RFC is the most an individual can still 
accomplish despite their limitations.  Id. § 404.1545(a)(1).  Although the ALJ is responsible 
for assessing an individual’s RFC, the ALJ must consider and evaluate any assessment of 
the individual’s RFC by a state agency, or medical, or psychological consultant.  See S.S.R. 
96-6p (July 2, 1996); see also S.S.R. 96-8p (July 2, 1996) (stating that the RFC assessment is 
derived from the following medical and non-medical sources:  (1) medical history; (2) 
medical signs and laboratory findings; (3) treating physician’s reports; (4) the effects of 
treatment, including limitations or restrictions imposed by the mechanics of treatment; (5) 
reports of daily activities; (5) lay evidence; (6) consultative examination reports; (7) the 
claimant’s testimony at the hearing; (8) the opinion from the DDS physician; (9) the effects 
of the symptoms, including pain, that is reasonably attributed to a medically determinable 
impairment; (10) work evaluations; (11) evidence from attempts to work; and (12) the need 
for a structured living environment). 
47 See WOLFE & POSZEK, supra note 8, at 173.  Only if it is determined that the claimant is 
rendered unable to perform previous employment will the question be considered whether 
there are other, less-demanding competitive jobs that the individual can perform.  Id.  
Arguably, the support behind steps four and five comes from a public policy to encourage 
individuals who are capable of work to do just that—work.  Id. at 52.  “[S]ociety should not 
have to supply a minimum daily sustenance to an individual who is capable of working at 
a competitive level.”  Id. 
48 See id. at 52 (explaining that once it is determined that the claimant is not able to return 
to a past job, the determination of whether there are other jobs that the claimant can 
perform must be made).  “Whatever criteria may be used in determining whether a 
claimant is capable of performing a significant number of jobs in the national economy, it is 
generally immaterial that the number of jobs that the claimant can perform is a small 
percentage of the total number of jobs in a given region.”  3 SOC. SEC. LAW & PRAC. § 43:137 
(Dec. 2007).  The term ‘region’ can refer to the number of jobs existing in the entire state.  
See Gonzalez v. Secretary of Health and Human Servs., 773 F. Supp. 994 (W.D. Mich. 1991) 
(discussing the broadness of the SSA’s definition of regional economy).  But see Meeks v. 
Apfel, 993 F. Supp. 1265 (W.D. Mo. 1997) (holding that the term ‘region’ can refer to the 
number of jobs existing in a particular area of the state). 
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the individual is not disabled under Social Security Regulations; if a 
significant number of jobs that the individual can perform does not exist 
in the national economy, then the SSA rules that the individual is 
disabled.49 
When determining disability, the SSA does not consider whether the 
individual filing for DIB would actually be hired if she applied for work; 
in other words, factors such as unemployment rates or job availability in 
the claimant’s hometown are not considered.50  Instead, the Social 
Security Regulations declare that the test for disability takes into account 
only the individual’s ability to complete work.51 
Thus far, this overview of the five-step sequential process has not 
discussed the use of a VE; that is because a VE becomes involved in the 
                                                 
49 See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(g) (2006).  If the individual can make an adjustment to other 
work, then that individual is not disabled under theSocial Security Regulations definition 
of disabled.  Id.  In order for the SSA to meet its burden at the fifth step, the SSA must 
demonstrate that the claimant can perform at least a substantial portion of the employment 
in the claimant’s assigned residual functional capacity category.  See Campbell v. Bowen, 
822 F.2d 1518 (10th Cir. 1987).  The SSA has enacted policies that state that a claimant is 
capable of performing other work when the range and kind of work for which the claimant 
is functionally and vocationally suited is broad enough that the claimant can be reasonably 
expected to make the vocational adjustment.  Id. at 1523. 
50 Ken Matheny, Social Security Disability and the Older Worker:   A Proposal for Reform, 10 
GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 37, 40 (2003) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A) (2002)) 
(stating that regardless of whether a specific job vacancy exists for the individual, or 
whether that individual would be hired if she applied for work, if the jobs exist in 
significant numbers in the national economy, then the individual is not disabled); see also 
WOLFE & POSZEK, supra note 8, at 52 (suggesting that the question is not whether there 
exists actual employment in the regional or national economy, rather, the question is 
whether, hypothetically, employment exists in the regional or national economy). 
51 See 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A) (2000).   
An individual shall be determined to be under a disability only if his 
physical or mental impairment or impairments are of such severity 
that he is not only unable to do his previous work but cannot, 
considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in any 
other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national 
economy, regardless of whether such work exists in the immediate 
area in which he lives, or whether a specific job vacancy exists for him, 
or whether he would be hired if he applied for work. . . . ‘work which 
exists in the national economy’ means work which exists in significant 
numbers ether in the region where such individual lives or in several 
regions of the country. 
Id. (citations omitted).  See also 3 SOC. SEC. LAW & PRAC, supra note 48, at § 43:137.   
[F]or the purpose of determining a claimant’s ability to engage in work 
other than past relevant work, work is considered to exist in the 
national economy when there [exists] a significant number of jobs, in 
one or more occupations, that have requirements that the claimant is 
able to meet with her physical or mental abilities and vocational 
qualifications. 
Id. 
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five-step sequential process only during the fourth and fifth steps (and 
plays an influential role only at the fifth step).52  Accordingly, this Note 
next focuses on the fourth and fifth steps of the five-step sequential 
process, and the SSA’s policies regarding VEs and their use of the DOT. 
C. The Fourth and Fifth Steps of the Five-Step Sequential Disability 
Determination Process:  Policy Objectives Regarding Vocational Experts, 
the Dictionary of Occupational Titles, and the Social Security 
Administration’s Legal Standards 
At the fourth of the five-step sequential disability determination, the 
Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) relies on VE testimony on a limited 
basis; at the fifth step, however, the SSA relies heavily on testimony from 
the VE who forms his or her opinion after reviewing the disability 
claimant’s records and data in the DOT.53  This testimony is crucial 
because neither the ALJ nor the claimant possess the ability to analyze 
the exertion or skill required by particular employment positions, 
because the categories in the DOT are organized in an exceedingly 
technical fashion.54  Thus, VE testimony serves as the foundational 
building block of the SSA disability determination process, because, 
without it, a complete, accurate, and reasonable decision would not be 
possible.55 
                                                 
52 TRAVER, supra note 2, § 1303 (stating that vocational evidence plays a critical role at 
only steps four and five of this sequential evaluation process). 
53 CAROLYN A. KUBITSCHEK, SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY:  LAW AND PROCEDURE IN 
FEDERAL COURT 158 (1994).  In determining whether a claimant can return to past relevant 
work, the ALJ must make a specific finding on that issue.  Id.  “In evaluating past work, the 
ALJ must make findings as to the physical and mental demands of that work, and the 
stress of that work.”  Id.  In complex cases, it is the responsibility of the ALJ to use a 
vocational expert to determine the exertional and non-exertional requirements of the 
claimant’s past work.  Id. at 224.  However, the ALJ may not rely upon a vocational expert 
in deciding whether the claimant can return to past work.  Id. at 223; see also infra note 86 
and accompanying text (discussing how the claimant bears the burden of proving that he 
or she is unable to perform any past work). 
54 WOLFE & POSZEK, supra note 8, at 155 (stating that such knowledge is beyond the 
knowledge of the ordinary person, and thus, requires a vocational expert); see also U.S. 
Department of Labor, Office of Administrative Law Judges, “U.S. Department of Labor, 
Office of Administrative Law Judges, ‘Dictionary of Occupational Titles (4th Ed., Rev. 
1991)—Appendix D,’” available at http://www.oalj.dol.gov/PUBLIC/DOT/ 
REFERENCES/DOTAPPD.HTM.  The DOT will assist in identifying occupational 
progression and skill transfers vertically within a technology or horizontally among closely 
related technologies.  Id.  Each occupational definition also provides essential job placement 
information by indicating the industry or industries in which a given occupation is found, 
and by describing job tasks and task variables.  Id. 
55 20 C.F.R. § 404.1566(e) (2006) (stating that if the issue in determining the individual’s 
disability rests upon whether the individual’s work skills can be used in other work and 
the specific occupations in which they can be used, or if a similarly complex issue exists, 
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1. The Vocational Expert 
A VE is a consultant who specializes in employment placement and 
occupational requirements.56  Although a VE is hired by the SSA, a VE is 
neither the SSA’s nor the claimant’s witness, but rather renders an 
impartial opinion based on evidence presented at a hearing and the 
claimant’s assigned RFC.57  Because a VE bases his opinion on pre-
hearing documentation and oral testimony of the claimant and others, 
the VE is normally the last witness to testify.58  The VE’s role is to 
provide an opinion regarding the skill and exertion levels of various 
jobs, the transferability of the claimant’s skills, and the employment 
positions that the applicant for disability benefits can or cannot 
perform.59 
The basis of a VE’s authority is the VE’s credentials.60  Thus, the SSA 
holds that an ALJ is authorized to defer to a proposed VE on the ground 
                                                                                                             
the Agency may use a vocational expert); see also Fines v. Apfel, 149 F.3d 893, 895 (8th Cir. 
1998) (stating that the Social Security regulations expect ALJs to consult VEs). 
56 See BUSH, supra note 39, § 340.  “Vocational experts testify . . . in many more social 
security disability hearings than do medical experts; but the experience, knowledge, ability, 
understanding of the VE role, and the prejudices of individual VEs vary much more widely 
than do the comparable skills and experience of medical experts.”  Id. 
57 WOLFE & POSZEK, supra note 8, at 155 (discussing how the VE is considered an 
independent contractor employed by the SSA); see also TRAVER, supra note 2, § 1302 (stating 
that “[t]hough paid for his professional services, the vocational expert is not an agent of the 
Social Security Administration[]”); HARVEY L. MCCORMICK, 2 SOCIAL SECURITY CLAIMS AND 
PROCEDURES 65 (1998) (discussing how the claimant should not make the point that the VE 
was selected and being paid by the SSA because the SSA will point out that the VE receives 
the same fee no matter what way the VE’s testimony is directed). 
58 TRAVER, supra note 2, § 1303 (discussing when the VE will normally testify at the 
disability hearing).  The VE’s observation of the claimant at the hearing might yield 
evaluative clues regarding appearance, responsiveness, general intelligence, 
communication skills, and other claimant characteristics.  Id.  Additionally, the VE might 
notice the claimant’s physical capacities, such as the use of limbs or physical endurance 
during the course of a lengthy hearing.  Id.  Furthermore, and maybe most importantly, the 
VE can also deduce the RFC for work from the claimant’s testimony about everyday 
activities.  Id. 
59 KUBITSCHEK, supra note 53, at 224.  The VE must “(1) assess the effect of any limitation 
on the range of work at issue; (2) advise whether the impaired person’s [residual functional 
capacity] permits him or her to perform substantial numbers of occupations within the 
range of work at issue; (3) identify jobs which are with the [residual functional capacity], if 
they exist[.]”  Id.  Additionally, the VE is permitted to testify as to whether a claimant has 
attained transferable skills in a prior job.  Id. at 225. 
60 See Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1218 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that the vocational 
expert’s own expertise establishes the necessary foundation for his or her testimony and 
thus no additional foundation is required). 
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that the VE has good credentials in a vocational field that is categorized 
as atypical and complex.61 
The broad deference afforded to a VE is limited by only two 
safeguards.62  First, while attempting to strike a balance between fairness 
and the implementation of an efficient, informal adjudication process, 
courts have held that VE testimony supporting a Social Security 
disability proceeding “is not ‘substantial’ if [that] vital testimony has 
been conjured out of whole cloth.”63  The other example of a check on 
VEs testimony is that if a contradiction exists between the VE’s 
testimony and the data contained in the DOT, the ALJ shall make an 
inquiry (similar to Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence (“Rule 702”)), 
to determine whether the VE’s testimony is reliable.64 
After a VE testifies and the ALJ asks whether the VE’s testimony is in 
accordance with the DOT, if the claimant does not question the VE’s 
reasoning (even if that reasoning contradicts the data contained in the 
DOT), then the claimant’s right to later question the reasoning is 
waived.65  This means that the claimant’s attorney needs to be well-
                                                 
61 See Zenith Elecs. Corp. v. WH-TV Broad, Corp., 395 F.3d 416, 420 (7th Cir. 2005) 
(stating that if an expert relies upon his or her expert intuition or curriculum vitae, then 
that expert’s extrapolations are neither normal among social scientists nor testable, and 
conclusions that are not falsifiable are not worth much to the court). 
62 See infra note 63 and accompanying text (discussing how substantial testimony is 
required to support a finding, and that if the testimony is merely hypothesized then it is 
not substantial); see also S.S.R. 00-4p (Dec. 4, 2000), available at www.ssa.gov/OP_Home/ 
rulings/di/02/SSR2000-04-di-02.html (explaining why and when the ALJ can rely upon a 
VE to give testimony at a disability hearing); infra note 130 and accompanying text 
(discussing how the ALJ has an obligation to play a gatekeeper role by asking if any 
inconsistencies exist between the VE’s testimony and the data contained within the DOT). 
63 Donahue v. Barnhart, 279 F.3d 441, 446 (7th Cir. 2002).  Although expert witnesses 
must meet the requirements of 702 (that (1) the testimony be based upon sufficient data; (2) 
the testimony satisfy the aspects of reliability; and (3) the expert applies the principles and 
methods reliably to the facts of the case), this heightened level of due process protection is 
not implemented in Social Security disability hearings which are a hybrid of the adversarial 
and the inquisitorial models.  Id.  The notion that experts should use reliable methods does 
not depend upon only Rule 702.  Id.  Rather, because the Social Security disability process 
requires a showing of substantial evidence, there is an appropriate check on the broad 
credibility granted to the VE.  Id.  “Evidence is not ‘substantial’ if vital testimony has been 
conjured out of whole cloth”.  Id. 
64 See Donahue, 279 F.3d at 446; see also TRAVER, supra note 2, § 1403.1.1 (stating that 
under S.S.R. 00-4p, the Social Security Commissioner states that only reliable job 
information available from various publications will be used). 
65 Donahue, 279 F.3d at 446 (stating that if no one questions the vocational expert's 
foundation or reasoning, an ALJ is entitled to accept the vocational expert’s conclusion, 
even if that conclusion differs from the DOT because the DOT, after all, just records other 
unexplained conclusions and is not even subject to cross-examination). 
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versed in the intricacies of the DOT and understand the methodologies 
used by VEs to form their conclusions.66 
On appeal, if a claimant wishes to challenge the VE’s testimony by 
arguing that the same claimant did not receive a fair hearing, the 
claimant must show that the ALJ’s behavior, in the context of the whole 
case, was so extreme as to display clear inability to render a fair 
judgment.67  This is a strict requirement to overcome and does not allow 
the claimant to attack the reliability of the VE’s testimony; rather, the 
claimant is forced to establish that the ALJ’s conduct is of such an 
extreme nature that a fair judgment is not possible.68 
As mentioned above, the VE’s testimony is based on the oral 
testimony of the claimant, the claimant’s RFC for work, and any of the 
claimant’s pre-hearing documentation.69  The VE takes into account all of 
this information and then places the assigned limitations into categories 
within the DOT to determine the types of jobs the claimant is able to 
perform.70  Thus, the DOT and the VE’s testimony are intricately linked, 
and because the DOT is the main source upon which the VE’s conclusion 
is based, familiarity with this reference is essential.71 
                                                 
66 TRAVER, supra note 2, § 1900.1 (discussing how undermining a VE’s credentials 
involves confirming whether the VE is a placement specialist and a labor market specialist, 
and more importantly, how those experiences provide the necessary competencies to assist 
the ALJ in determining the truth). 
67 See Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1215 (9th Cir. 2005) (discussing the standard 
that a disability claimant must overcome in order to successfully argue that a fair hearing 
was denied). 
68 TRAVER, supra note 2, § 1900.3.  This challenging requirement enacted by the SSA 
should be criticized for allowing the poor quality of scientific analyses conducted by many 
VEs as well as the SSA’s practice of obscuring its assumptions by disguising policy-based 
decisions as scientific ones.  Id.  
69 KUBITSCHEK, supra note 53, at 217.  The VE may assess the effect of any exertional or 
non-exertional limitations on the range of work at issue (e.g., the potential occupational 
base); 
advise whether the impaired person’s [residual functional capacity 
permits] him or her to perform substantial numbers of occupations 
within the range of work at issue; identify jobs which are within the 
[residual functional capacity], if they exist; and provide a statement of 
the incidence of such jobs in the region in which the person lives or 
several regions of the country. 
Id. (quoting S.S.R. 83-12 (Nov. 30, 1982)); DeFrancesco v. Bowen, 867 F.2d 1040 (7th Cir. 
1989). 
70 KUBITSCHEK, supra note 53, at 225–26 (discussing how a VE needs to know not only 
what sort of skills and characteristics that a claimant needs to do a job, but also the 
characteristics of the various jobs that exist, which are located in the DOT). 
71 See TRAVER, supra note 2, § 1400 (stating that it is crucial to understand the DOT 
because of the SSA’s reliance upon the VE’s testimony which is based in part on data found 
in the DOT); see also S.S.R. 00-4p (Dec. 4, 2000), available at www.ssa.gov/OP_Home/ 
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2. The Dictionary of Occupational Titles 
The DOT is a publication of the U.S. Department of Labor that 
provides basic occupational information by classifying jobs into 
occupations based on their similarities and also defining the structure 
and content of all listed occupations.72  Interestingly, this source was last 
modified twenty-five years ago, and the latest edition, the Fourth 
Edition, of the DOT was last updated in 1991.73  In addition, the United 
States Department of Commerce (U.S. Census Bureau) has replaced the 
DOT with the Standard Occupational Classification (“SOC”).74  Because 
the DOT is obsolete, a link no longer exists between Census Codes and 
                                                                                                             
rulings/di/02/SSR2000-04-di-02.html (providing an example of how significant the DOT is 
to the SSA’s adjudication process). 
72 See KUBITSCHEK, supra note 53, at 218 (discussing the various aspects and the 
information contained within the DOT); see also TRAVER, supra note 2, § 1400 (discussing the 
basic contents and data found within the DOT). 
73 See U.S. Department of Labor, Office of Administrative Law Judges, “United States 
Department of Labor Dictionary of Occupational Titles Fourth Edition, Revised 1991,” 
available at http://www.oalj.dol.gov/libDOT.htm.  “The DOT was created by the 
Employment and Training Administration, and was last updated in 1991.  The DOT is 
included on the Office of Administrative Law Judges web site because it is a standard 
reference in several types of cases adjudicated by the Office of Administrative Law Judges, 
especially labor-related immigration cases.  The DOT, however, has been replaced by the 
O*NET.”  Id. (discussing the history of the DOT). 
74 KUBITSCHEK, supra note 53, at 219.  During the early 1980s, the United States 
Department of Labor published the Selected Characteristics of the Dictionary of 
Occupational Titles, as a companion volume to DOT.  Id. at 218.  Because “[t]he new 
version of the DOT does not list the environmental factors present at each job, as Selected 
Characteristics did . . . [,]” the SSA permits the use of both for a more complete explanation 
of the characteristics of each job.  Id. at 219 (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 404.1566(d ) (2006)).  See also 
TRAVER, supra note 2, § 1501 (stating that because the DOT does not contain adequate data 
to be useful to the Social Security Administration’s adjudication system, the SSA refers to 
SCO, as well as other sources of vocational data).  The following example illustrates how 
the DOT became obsolete and how the SSA could replace the DOT with an updated 
occupational source called O*NET: 
With the introduction of the Department of Labor’s 1998 database for 
analyzing jobs, known as the Occupational Information Network 
(O*NET), the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT) and related 
Department of Labor publications including the Selected Characteristics 
became obsolete, as did their underlying occupational methodology 
and framework.  Moreover, with the conversion by the Department of 
Labor to the O*NET methodology for analyzing jobs, the Social 
Security Administration’s Regulations for adjudicating medical-
vocational issues no longer conform to the Department of Labor’s 
methodology for analyzing jobs. 
Id. § 1503. 
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the DOT, which means that no useful source of job information provides 
data for the titles in the DOT.75 
Furthermore, many jobs listed in the DOT no longer exist and many 
jobs that now exist are not yet listed in the archaic DOT.76  Nonetheless, a 
VE often attempts to categorize a claimant’s previous work using a ratio 
of equivalencies to jobs listed.77  Essentially, a VE must statistically break 
down the source data to estimate the number of jobs available in the 
appropriate categories of the DOT.78  This is a complicated endeavor, and 
if a VE has not received education or training in occupational analysis, 
then the VE’s qualifications and testimony lack reliability.79 
The claimant additionally faces an uphill battle if the claimant 
wishes to challenge the reliability of the DOT because the SSA relies so 
heavily on the DOT and both the fourth and fifth steps of the sequential 
process are entwined with data found in the DOT.80  To understand the 
intricate roles that the VE and the DOT play at the fourth and fifth steps, 
it is essential to have a solid understanding of these steps.81 
                                                 
75 David Traver, A Brief Introduction to U.S. Census Bureau Occupation Codes and the Myth 
of Vocational Testimony, CONNECT, Oct. 1, 2007, http://www.ssaconnect.com/content/ 
view/55/175/html.  Because there is no longer a link between the Census Codes and the 
DOT, the VEs must do something none of them are qualified as Economist to do, namely 
break down statistically the source raw data of job counting to project or estimate the 
number of jobs in the smaller component categories of the DOT.  Id.  In the past, VEs 
merely took the data from the State governmental departments that used the DOT and 
testified that an identified number of jobs existed and could be done by an afflicted 
claimant.  Id.  Under this process, their judgment was vocational in nature and they could 
do this with their educational and experienced backgrounds, having placed people in jobs.  
Id.  
76 See WOLFE & POSZEK, supra note 8, at 149. 
77 Id.; see also MCCORMICK, supra note 57, at 62 (citing Pendergraph v. Celebrezze, 255 F. 
Supp. 313 (M.D. N.C. 1966)) (stating that too much reliance on the DOT by the VE does not 
comply with the substantial evidence rule).  
78 See supra note 76 and accompanying text (arguing that if the vocational expert is not 
qualified to perform job analysis, or if the vocational expert has not used job analysis 
standards that are applicable to the vocational profession, then the testimony should be 
rejected). 
79 See Traver, supra note 75 (stating that the VE is required to have specialized training 
dealing with occupational analysis); see also Solomon, supra note 9, at 210 (stating that 
under HALLEX, the VE is first subject to voir dire on his or her qualifications, and then on 
the content of his or her testimony); supra note 9 and accompanying text (discussing the 
contents and uses of HALLEX). 
80 See Donahue v. Barnhart, 279 F.3d 441, 445 (7th Cir. 2002).  Because the DOT is 
published by the Department of Labor as a reference tool; it does not purport to contain 
rules of law, and no statute or regulation gives it binding force.  Id.  Thus, there is a need 
for the VE to match the facts, i.e., the limitations of the claimant to relevant job data within 
the DOT.  Id. 
81 See TRAVER, supra note 2, § 1400 (stating that familiarity with and knowledge of the 
DOT is essential to disability practice at the SSA because use and reliance upon the DOT 
and its progeny are firmly embedded in the SSA’s regulations). 
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3. The Fourth of the Five-Step Sequential Disability Determination 
Process 
During the fourth of the five-step sequential disability determination 
process, the VE takes the claimant’s assigned RFC for work and matches 
it against the job data in the DOT to determine if the claimant can 
competitively hold a job that he or she held within the past fifteen 
years.82  For the first time in the sequential process, the claimant’s RFC 
for work is measured according to actual work previously performed.83  
This is also the first time when the full public policy underlying the 
disability program is tested:  given the client’s RFC for work, can she or 
he actually engage in competitive work?84  If it is determined that the 
claimant is able to perform past relevant work, then the process stops 
there and the claimant is found not disabled.85  If the claimant reaches 
the fifth step, the burden shifts to the SSA86 to demonstrate that reference 
to the Medical-Vocational Guidelines (the “Grids”)87 dictates that either 
                                                 
82 20 C.F.R. § 404.1565 (2006).  The fifteen-year standard is meant to protect the claimant 
from having remote jobs considered against him or her because it is no longer realistic to 
expect that skills and abilities learned in that job are relevant, let alone honed.  See id. 
83 KUBITSCHEK, supra note 53, at 220 (citing S.S.R. 85-15 (Nov. 30, 1984)).  A VE is 
permitted to testify in cases in which the issue is whether the claimant can make a 
vocational adjustment to a new job, considering his or her remaining occupational base (as 
a result of reduced residual functional capacity) with his or her age, education, and past 
work experience.  Id. 
84 WOLFE & POSZEK, supra note 8, at 147 (discussing the importance of past relevant 
work). 
85 See Larry M. Gropman, Social Security, 1996 DET. C.L. REV. 517, 525 (1996) (stating that 
it is important to note that the fifteen-year standard does not apply to unskilled jobs 
because such work does not entail complex cognitive demands and can be learned after 
brief training); see also Smith v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 893 F.2d 106, 110 (6th Cir. 
1989) (stating that if it is determined that the claimant can perform his or her past relevant 
work, a finding of not disabled is rendered and there is no need for testimony from a 
vocational expert because the sequential process stops there).   
86 KUBITSCHEK, supra note 53, at 216.  To meet this burden, the ALJ must support the 
finding with substantial evidence that the claimant has the vocational qualifications to 
perform specific jobs.  See O’Banner v. Sec’y of Health, Educ. & Welfare, 587 F.2d 321, 323 
(6th Cir. 1978).  The burden of proof rests upon the claimant throughout the first four steps.  
WOLFE & POSZEK, supra note 8, at 169.  The disability claimant must prove by a 
preponderance of the evidence each of the requirements necessary to keep advancing 
through the sequential evaluation process.  Id.  Thus, at the fourth step the claimant must 
demonstrate that she can no longer perform her past work.  Id. 
87 KUBITSCHEK, supra note 53, at 216.  The Medical-Vocation Guidelines represent 
outcome-determinative assumptions.  WOLFE & POSZEK, supra note 8, at 177.  “If a specific 
set of conditions exists, considering a variety of factors, the law presumes that the claimant 
is or is not disabled.”  Id.  “In each Grid rule are discrete factors that must be determined in 
order to properly apply the rules.”  Id.  To illustrate, if the “claimant was found to be 
limited to sedentary work, was fifty-five years of age, [and] was a high school graduate, 
but . . . [the claimant’s] education did not otherwise provide for direct entry into skilled 
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the claimant is able to perform other substantial gainful employment88 or 
that a significant number of jobs that the claimant is able to perform is 
available in the national economy.89 
                                                                                                             
work, and . . .  [the claimant’s] skills were not transferable[]” under Grid rule 201.06, the 
claimant would be deemed disabled.  Id.  The RFC assigned by the ALJ to the claimant 
determines which table of the Medical-Vocational Guidelines is to be used:  Table One 
applies to individuals whose RFC limits them to sedentary work; Table Two applies to 
individuals whose RFC limits them to light work; and Table Three to those limited to 
medium work.  See 20 C.F.R. pt. 404 subpart P App. 2 (2006).  Interestingly, no tables exist 
for claimants able to perform heavy or very heavy work, probably because the Guidelines 
state that regardless of the claimant’s age, education, or work experience, sufficient jobs 
exist in the national economy for claimaint’s whose RFCs indicate that they are capable of 
achieving substantial gainful activity.  Id.  On the other extreme, if a claimant is found to be 
unable to perform work at even a sedentary level, the claimant will be presumed to be 
disabled, absent specific evidence to the contrary.  Id. 
88 KUBITSCHEK, supra note 53, at 216.  If the claimant’s vocational factors and assigned 
RFC coincide with all of the criteria of a particular rule, that Grid rule dictates a finding of 
either disabled or not disabled.  See Gropman, supra note 7, at 527.  If the claimant matches 
one of the Grid rules, the Medical-Vocational Guidelines provide substantial evidence that 
the claimant is capable of performing gainful work in the national economy.  Id. at 528.  In 
Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U.S. 458 (1983), the Supreme Court upheld the Medical-Vocational 
Guidelines suggesting that the Grids provide the SSA with a shortcut that make the process 
more efficient and eliminate the need for calling vocational experts.  Id.  However, the 
Court warned that the Grids are applicable only when the claimant’s RFC or relevant 
vocational factors match exactly those reflected in the particular Grid rule.  Id.; see also 
S.S.R. 83-14 (Nov. 30, 1982) (stating that no Grid rule mandates a conclusion of ‘Disabled’ 
or ‘Not Disabled’ where a claimant has a non-exertional limitation or restriction imposed 
by a medically determinable impairment). 
89 See Myers v. Apfel, 238 F.3d 617, 619 (5th Cir. 2001) (stating that the claimant has the 
burden of proving disability under the first four steps); see also Savage v. Barnhart, 372 F. 
Supp. 2d 922, 927 (S.D. Tex. 2005) (stating that if the claimant is successful in carrying her 
burden through the first four steps, the burden shifts to the SSA at step five to show that 
other substantial gainful employment, which the claimant is capable of performing, is 
available in the national economy); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520 (2006) (stating that if the SSA is 
able to verify that other employment exists in significant numbers in the national 
economy—employment that the disability benefits claimant is capable of performing in 
spite of his or her existing impairments—the burden shifts back to the claimant to prove 
that he or she is unable to perform the alternative work described).  In Barnhart v. Thomas, 
the Court addressed whether an applicant for disability benefits under the SSA could 
qualify as disabled if he or she can perform his or her previous job, even if that job 
disappeared from the economy.  540 U.S. 20, 21 (2003).  The claimant (Thomas) who had 
previously worked as an elevator operator applied for disability benefits and was 
subsequently denied benefits because her impairments did not prevent her from 
performing her previous work.  Id. at 22.  Although the claimant argued that her job had 
largely disappeared from the national economy, the ALJ did not find the disappearance of 
her job to be relevant.  Id.  The Court interpreted the statute as creating two separate 
requirements for disability—that an applicant must be unable to do her previous work and 
that she must be unable to find any substantial work which exists in the national economy.  
Id. at 24.  The issue arose that although, by the terms of the statute, substantial gainful work 
must exist in the national economy it is not clear whether previous work must also exist in 
the national economy.  Id. at 28.  The Court noted that the SSA, through its regulations, had 
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4. The Fifth of the Five-Step Sequential Disability Determination 
Process 
The main function of the fifth of the five-step sequential disability 
determination process is for the SSA to prove that the claimant is able to 
perform other jobs that exist in significant numbers; one method of 
demonstrating that a significant number of jobs exist in the national 
economy is through the use of the Grids.90  The Grids cannot be applied 
to claimants who have non-exertion characteristics because the Grids 
were constructed to apply only to claimants’ exertional abilities.91  Thus, 
if the Grids are not applicable, because either the Grids cannot be 
applied or because the claimant’s RFC or relevant vocational factors are 
different from those reflected in a particular grid rule, the SSA must use 
other means of proving that jobs exist that the claimant can perform.92  
The most common way to prove that jobs exist is through the use of the 
testimony of the VE.93  The ALJ directs questions to the VE that 
                                                                                                             
interpreted the statute to reject such a requirement and that the five-step process 
promulgated by the SSA, defers the inquiry into the state of jobs in the national economy 
until the fifth step.  Id.  The Court held SSA’s interpretation of the statute was correct and 
that the lower court erred by ignoring canons of grammatical construction which indicated 
that the qualifying phrase that exists in the national economy should only apply to 
substantial gainful work.  Id.  The Court reasoned that consideration of the claimant’s 
previous employment may function as a proxy for an analysis of employment existing 
throughout the economy, regardless of whether a previous job exists in the economy.  Id.  
The Court justified its reasoning by stating that such an interpretation allows the SSA to 
avoid the burden of analyzing applications individually.  Id. at 29. 
90 KUBITSCHEK, supra note 53, at 216 (discussing an overview of vocational evidence 
within the sequential evaluation process). 
91 See WOLFE & POSZEK, supra note 8, at 178.  The Grid rules consider the following 
factors:  (1) the claimant’s age; (2) the claimant’s educational attainment; (3) the claimant’s 
skill level, e.g., past work experience; and (4) the claimant’s exertional level.  Id.  “Each 
factor represents a sliding scale of possibilities, and each possibility has the potential to 
dramatically affect the outcome shown by the Grid rule.”  Id. 
92 KUBITSCHEK, supra note 53, at 217.  If the Grids are deemed inapplicable, “then the 
courts have uniformly held that Social Security Administration must use other means of 
proving that other jobs exist in the national economy which the claimant can perform.”  Id. 
(citing Buck v. Bowen, 885 F.2d 451 (8th Cir. 1989)). 
93 Solomon, supra note 9, at 209.  In order for reliance on the vocational expert’s opinion 
to be justified, the ALJ must pose the hypothetical question so that it incorporates and fully 
sets forth the claimant’s impairments.  See Totz v. Sullivan, 961 F.2d 727, 730 (8th Cir. 1992) 
(citing Shelltrack v. Sullivan, 961 F.2d 894, 898 (8th Cir. 1991)); see also Hinchey v. Shalala, 
29 F.3d 428, 432 (8th Cir. 1994) (stating that when a hypothetical question does not 
encompass all relevant impairments, VE testimony does not constitute substantial evidence 
to support the ALJ’s decision).  The ALJ will ask the VE to assume certain facts, such as the 
existence of a hypothetical individual who is the same age as the claimant and has the same 
educational and occupational history.  See WOLFE & POSZEK, supra note 8, at 52.  After 
laying this foundation, the ALJ poses a set of limitations, asking whether, given these 
limitations, there is other less-demanding employment that the individual can perform.  Id.  
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incorporate hypothetical situations.  The ALJ’s hypothetical questions 
presume that the facts presented in the claimant’s case are true.94  The 
hypothetical questions start with the least restrictive RFC for work, and 
subsequently, the ALJ adds new limitations to each additional 
hypothetical question.95 
                                                                                                             
In Fast v. Barnhart, 397 F.3d 468 (7th Cir. 2005), the claimant’s impairments were only 
mental.  Id.  The ALJ assigned an RFC with only non-exertional limitations, and relied on 
VE testimony to find that the claimant could perform some 16,000 jobs in the region and 
thus was not disabled.  Id. at 469.  The court affirmed, stating that the ALJ properly 
considered VE testimony where non-exertional limitations substantially limited the range 
of work that the claimant could perform.  Id. at 468.  The claimant had argued that the ALJ 
was not permitted to deny benefits based on the VE’s testimony because the claimant 
would be disabled under the Grid rules if limited to sedentary work and because the 
number of jobs that the VE identified was less than the total number of sedentary unskilled 
jobs.  Id. at 469.  Under these circumstances, the claimant asserted that the Social Security 
regulations required the ALJ to find the claimant disabled using the Grids as a framework.  
Id.  The court held that the claimant’s argument conflicted with the common-sense rule that 
where the Grids do not address a particular problem, the ALJ is entitled to rely on the 
expert testimony of a VE.  Id. at 472.  This outcome means that the Grids do not apply as a 
framework at all when a claimant has solely non-exertional limitations.  Id. 
94 WOLFE & POSZEK, supra note 8, at 193.  During the first four steps, the claimant has the 
burden of proving his or her disability.  See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1512(a) (2006); see also 42 U.S.C. 
§ 423(d)(5)(A) (2000) (stating that the claimant will not be considered to possess a disability 
unless the claimant furnishes such medical and other evidence to the SSA).  Nevertheless, 
jurisprudence makes clear that upon proof by a claimant that he or she cannot perform 
prior work, e.g., that the claimant has satisfied step four, the burden shifts to the SSA to 
prove that the claimant can perform other work available in the national economy.  Bloch 
et al., supra note 32, at 1; see also Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 146 (1987).  In Yuckert, the 
Court determined that Congress conferred on the SSA Commissioner exceptionally broad 
authority to prescribe standards for applying certain sections of the Act.  Yuckert, 482 U.S. 
at 146 (citing Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U.S. 458, 466 (1983) (quoting Schweiker v. Gray 
Panthers, 453 U.S. 34, 43, (1981))).  The Yuckert Court also determined that the SSA 
authorizes the Commissioner to adopt reasonable and proper rules and regulations to 
regulate and provide for the nature and extent of the proof and evidence and the method of 
taking and furnishing the same in disability cases.  Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 405(a)).  The 
Yuckert Court then pointed out that where the statute expressly entrusts the Commissioner 
with the responsibility of implementing a provision by regulation, review is limited to 
determining whether the regulations promulgated exceeded the Commissioner’s statutory 
authority and whether they are arbitrary and capricious.  Id. (quoting Heckler v. Campbell, 
461 U.S. 458, 466 (1983)). 
95 WOLFE & POSZEK, supra note 8, at 193.  The ALJ’s first hypothetical question is 
normally the least restrictive RFC, followed by the second hypothetical which builds on the 
first, using the original limitations as a foundation on which new, more restrictive 
limitations are layered.  Id. at 192.  The third hypothetical is the most restrictive RFC.  Id.  
An example of the sequential nature of these hypothetical questions is as follows:  (1) a 
light RFC (frequently lift ten pounds, occasionally twenty pounds); then (2) a light RFC 
with sit-stand option (sit thirty minutes; stand thirty minutes); and then (3) a light RFC, 
with sit-stand option and the need to lie down two times each day (in the morning and 
afternoon because of drowsiness from medication side effects).  Id.  “This layered effect 
allows both the judge and the representative to clearly delineate the claimant’s restrictions, 
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In this fifth step, the VE plays his or her most significant role in the 
disability determination process.96  The VE testifies regarding whether, 
using the claimant’s RFC and the ALJ’s hypothetical limitations, in 
comparison with employment data taken from the DOT, the claimant 
can perform other work that exists in significant numbers within the 
national economy.97  Essentially, the VE’s testimony—which supports a 
finding that in view of the claimant’s age, education, and work 
experience other work exists or does not exist in the national economy—
is based on data from the DOT.98 
                                                                                                             
and further allows the representative to monitor the limitations the judge is considering.”  
Id. at 193.  An example of the typical structure of an ALJ hypothetical question at the least 
restrictive level is as follows: 
Given your opinion that the claimant cannot return to past work, 
assume with me the existence of an individual the same age as the 
claimant, with the same vocational history and education.  Now 
assume that this person can only lift fifteen pounds at a time, cannot sit 
longer than one hour at a time before having to stand; cannot stand for 
more than thirty minutes at a time before having to sit, and, because of 
asthma cannot be exposed to dust, gases, fumes, or odors.  Are there 
other, less demanding jobs that this individual can perform? 
Id. at 190. 
96 See McKinnie v. Barnhart, 368 F.3d 907, 910 (7th Cir. 2004) (stating that in social 
security disability cases, the ALJ may depend on the VE’s testimony to find the claimant 
disabled or not disabled); see also TRAVER, supra note 2, § 1403.1.1 (stating that “the SSA’s 
disability adjudication framework is founded on the DOT and the supporting assumptions, 
research, data, and vocational theories (or lack thereof)[]”). 
97 See infra note 74 and accompanying text (discussing the antiquity of the DOT); see also 
TRAVER, supra note 2, § 1500 (discussing how the vocational expert’s testimony is based on 
information from the DOT and other labor statistic sources).  See also WOLFE & POSZEK, 
supra note 8, at 149.  Because the DOT has not been updated in many years, job descriptions 
have changed and many jobs now exist that are not described in the DOT.  Id.  
Nevertheless, a VE will often attempt to categorize a claimant’s previous work using 
equivalencies to jobs that are listed.  Id.  “The danger, of course, is that without specific 
testimony about actual work duties, the client may be held to the standard of the 
‘approximated’ DOT entry, which may or may not reflect the work actually done on the 
job.”  Id. 
98 20 C.F.R. § 404.1566(d)(1) (2006) (stating that the Agency relies on the DOT, published 
by the Department of Labor); see also Lynn Martin, U.S. Department of Labor, Office of 
Administrative Law Judges, “Dictionary of Occupational Titles (4th Ed., Rev. 1991)–
Message From The Secretary,” available at http://www.oalj.dol.gov/PUBLIC/DOT/ 
REFERENCES/DOTMESS.HTM (stating that “[s]ince its inception, the . . . DOT has 
provided basic occupational information to many and varied users in both public and 
private sectors of the United States economy[]”); WOLFE & POSZEK, supra note 8, at 149 
(stating that the vocational expert renders an opinion that includes several components, 
mostly through reliance on the DOT, including the following:  (1) the job title, with 
appropriate reference to the job listing set forth in the DOT; (2) the exertional level required 
by the job (whether the job requires sedentary, light, medium, heavy, or very heavy); and 
(3) the skills associated with performing the job). 
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The claimant is assured that the SSA relies on reliable job 
information available from various publications, including the DOT and 
other documents, as provided by the regulations.99  Thus, as determined 
by the ALJ after relying on the testimony of the VE, the claimant is 
entitled to DIB only if a significant number of jobs that he or she is able 
to perform is not available in the national economy.100 
Section 405(g) of the SSA allows unsuccessful claimants to seek 
judicial review of the ALJ’s decision.101  However, the scope of judicial 
review in such cases is limited because the SSA’s denial of benefits is not 
to be disturbed if it is supported by substantial evidence and contains no 
legal error.102  In regard to Social Security disability proceedings, 
substantial evidence is “more than a mere scintilla, but may be less than 
a preponderance.”103  Indeed, the ALJ’s resolution of evidentiary 
conflicts requires such deference.104 
Considering the high level of deference given to the SSA with regard 
to evidentiary matters, and the relatively broad credibility granted to VE 
testimony, questions of reliability and fairness are bound to arise in 
Social Security disability proceedings.105  The lack of concrete standards 
                                                 
99 TRAVER, supra note 2, § 1403.1.2 (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 404.1566(d ) (2006)). 
100 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(f) (2006); see also WOLFE & POSZEK, supra note 8, at, 173 (discussing 
the only two steps at which a claimant can be granted benefits:  step-three (the medical 
listings) and step-five (the step in which the claimant’s RFC determines whether there are 
other less-demanding jobs that can be performed, or, if not, whether benefits will be 
granted)).  
101 See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (2000) (setting forth the requirements claimants must meet in 
order to challenge the ALJ’s determination); see also supra note 67 and accompanying text 
(discussing the challenging obstacles the claimant must overcome in order to be successful 
in arguing that she was not afforded a fair hearing). 
102 See Batson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1197 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding 
that when the evidence before the ALJ is subject to more than one rational interpretation, 
deference must be given to the ALJ’s conclusion); see also Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 
1098 (9th Cir. 1999) (stating that “[i]f the evidence can support either outcome, the 
[reviewing] court may not substitute its judgment for that of the ALJ[]”) (quoting Sousa v. 
Callahan, 143 F.3d 1240, 1243 (9th Cir. 1998)).  But see Hammock v. Bowen, 879 F.2d 498, 
501 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that the Appeals Council’s decision cannot be affirmed simply 
by isolating a specific quantum of supporting evidence).  Rather, a court must “consider 
the record as a whole, weighing both evidence that supports and evidence that detracts 
from the [SSA] Secretary’s conclusion.”  Penny v. Sullivan, 2 F.3d 953, 956 (9th Cir. 1993); 
see also Howard v. Heckler, 782 F.2d 1484, 1487 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding that the record as a 
whole must be considered). 
103 Lewis v. Apfel, 236 F.3d 503, 509 (9th Cir. 2001); see also Howard ex rel. Wolff v. 
Barnhart, 341 F.3d 1006, 1012 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding substantial evidence in the record 
despite ALJ’s failure to discuss every piece of evidence). 
104 See Lewis, 236 F.3d. at 509 (stating that deference must be given to the ALJ’s credibility 
determinations and resolutions of evidentiary conflicts). 
105 See Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1218 (9th Cir. 2005) (emphasis added) (stating 
that the vocational expert’s own expertise provides the necessary foundation for his or her 
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regulating the methodology used by VEs is the key factor undermining 
the integrity of the five-step sequential disability determination 
process.106  For this reason, the next section addresses the progression of 
evidentiary standards as they apply to expert witnesses, as well as the 
SSA’s attempt to curb the broad credibility granted to VEs.107 
D. Evidence:  Pre- and Post-Daubert Standards and Post-Daubert SSA 
Policies 
Because the VE testifies at the disability hearing and that testimony 
is used by the ALJ to determine whether a claimant is disabled, a 
standard is needed to define the specific requirements that the VE’s 
testimony and the VE’s methodology must satisfy in order to maintain 
the integrity of the VE’s testimony.108  The most well-known example of 
a standard that places a check on the testimony of an expert is Rule 702, 
but before the adoption of Rule 702, American courts relied on the Frye 
standard.109 
                                                                                                             
testimony and no other foundation is required); see also Dobrowolsky v. Califano, 606 F.2d 
403, 408 (3d Cir. 1979) (stating that vocational expert testimony without a foundation is not 
substantial evidence in a disability hearing).  But see Donahue v. Barnhart, 279 F.3d 441, 446 
(7th Cir. 2002) (stating that even though Rule 702 does not apply, the vocational expert’s 
testimony must still be based upon substantial evidence because vital testimony is not 
substantial if it is conjured out of “whole cloth”). 
106 See Traver, supra note 75.  At the fifth step, the ALJ calls on the testimony of a 
vocational expert, and the testimony from these experts is based on the DOT.  Id.  
Astonishingly, when the vocational expert reaches the stage of testimony regarding 
particular jobs and the number of jobs in the regional economy, some experts may be 
inclined to hypothesize about data.  Id.  Because data sources are no longer tracked to the 
DOT and a statistical evaluation is now necessary, the VEs who are trained and qualified to 
understand employment and job placement, do not have the appropriate preparation to 
manipulate job data to identify components of job groups provided by the DOT.  Id.  Thus, 
the VE’s methodology is outside the parameters of their training.  Id.  When the VE gives 
the based upon my experience answer, the VE should be able to back thatanswer up with 
explanations that support the testimony.  Id.  In the absence of that foundation, the 
testimony is simple ipse dixit.  Id.  See also TRAVER, supra note 2, §1900.4 (stating that 
“attacking the VE’s credentials involves confirming whether the VE is a placement 
specialist and a labor market specialist, and more importantly, how those experiences 
provide the necessary competencies to assist the ALJ in the adjudicative process[]”). 
107 See infra notes 108–39 and accompanying text (discussing evidentiary standards as 
they apply to experts and the SSA’s attempt to put a check on the broad credibility granted 
to VEs, thereby ensuring that claimants are afforded an adequate level of fairness). 
108 TRAVER, supra note 2, § 1302 (discussing how the SSA created the role of the VE to 
dispassionately contribute his or her vocational evidence toward reaching an equitable 
decision). 
109 See Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).  In Frye, the defense offered a 
scientist as an expert to testify that the result of a blood pressure deception test, conducted 
on the defendant before the trial, proved that the defendant was innocent.  Id. at 1013–14.  
The court held that the testimony resulting from the test, which the defense hoped to 
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1. Pre-Daubert:  Frye v. United States 
Before implementation of Rule 702,110 the Frye general acceptance 
standard was the established standard for determining the admissibility 
of expert testimony.111  This standard required testimony from experts in 
relatively novel scientific fields to be closely scrutinized and ultimately 
ruled inadmissible if the expert’s conclusions had not yet gained 
scientific recognition among other experts in the novel scientific field.112 
2. Daubert v. Merrill Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 
In 1983, Daubert incorporated into evidentiary jurisprudence the 
notion that judges act as gatekeepers; this required a judge to determine 
whether a proffered expert opinion is both relevant and reliable to the 
issue being sought for admission.113  Daubert established that federal 
                                                                                                             
admit, had not yet achieved standing and scientific recognition among physiological and 
psychological authorities and thus was inadmissible.  Id. at 1014. 
110 See FED. R. EVID. 702 (stating that an expert witness may testify when the testimony is 
based upon sufficient facts or data, the testimony is the product of reliable principles and 
methods, and the witness has applied the principles and methods to the facts of the case in 
a reliable manner); see also 33A FED. PROC., L. ED. § 80:213 (stating that although Rule 702 
does not require absolute certainty of a result for the admissibility of expert testimony, the 
gatekeepers must find that the testimony is properly grounded, well-reasoned, and free 
from speculation). 
111 Frye, 293 F. at 1013 (stating that originally the general rule was that the opinions of 
experts were admissible as evidence in those cases in which the matter of inquiry was such 
that inexperienced persons were unlikely to prove capable of forming a correct judgment 
on those opinions). 
112 See id. at 1014 (stating that if the question involved does not lie within the range of 
common experience or common knowledge, but requires special experience or special 
knowledge, then the opinions of witnesses skilled in that particular science, art, or trade to 
which the question relates are admissible in evidence). 
113 Daubert v. Merrill Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).  In Daubert, the 
Court considered whether the Frye test had been superseded by of Rule 702.  Id.  The 
plaintiffs sued Merrill Dow, alleging that birth defects suffered by their children resulted 
from the ingestion of the drug Bendectin while the mothers were pregnant.  Id. at 582.  
Merrill Dow sought summary judgment on the grounds that the plaintiffs could not 
present any admissible evidence to prove Bendectin caused the alleged birth defects.  Id.  
Because the plaintiffs’ expert witnesses’ testimonies—that the drug could cause birth 
defects—were based on animal studies, the defendant’s expert testified that no study had 
linked the drug to birth defects in humans.  Id. at 582.  Merrill Dow argued that the 
abandonment of Frye’s general acceptance standard would result in confused juries not 
capable of understanding absurd and irrational pseudoscientific assertions.  Id. at 595–96.  
The Court realized that Rule 702 granted expert witnesses wide latitude to express 
opinions not afforded to ordinary witnesses.  Id. at 592.  However, the Court held that 
intense cross examination, offering conflicting evidence and proper jury instructions, 
would be an effective method of attacking questionable, but admissible, evidence.  Id. at 
596. 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 43, No. 1 [2008], Art. 8
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol43/iss1/8
2008] Social Security Disability Hearings 381 
judges cannot merely defer to a proposed expert on the ground that the 
expert has good credentials in a field that is atypical or complex.114  Any 
prospective expert evidence that is not both reliable and relevant must be 
excluded by the gatekeeper because it is speculation rather than 
knowledge.115 
Eventually, the Supreme Court expanded Daubert by declaring that 
gatekeepers must ensure that any and all scientific testimony is not only 
relevant, but reliable, and gatekeepers must apply this rule equally to all 
expert testimony.116  Under Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, courts are 
expected to filter the good science from the bad science and thus ensure 
that the proposed expert testimony is supported by appropriate 
validation.117 
                                                 
114 See Margaret A. Berger, What Has a Decade of Daubert Wrought?, AMER. J. OF PUB. 
HEALTH, July 2005, S60 (stating that before Daubert, courts normally deferred to the various 
fields of experts); see also Paul S. Miller and Bert W. Rein, “Gatekeeping” Agency Reliance on 
Scientific and Technical Materials After Daubert:  Ensuring Relevance and Reliability in the 
Administrative Process, 17 TOURO L. REV. 297, 303 (2000) (stating that “[n]o longer may a 
federal judge simply ‘defer’ to a proposed expert on the ground that he or she has good 
credentials in a field that is unusual or difficult[]”).  See also Stewart Lee, Comment, 
Evidence-Expert Witnesses-Daubert Applies to All Expert Testimony, 69 MISS. L.J. 979 (1999).  
Lee discusses the application of the Daubert standard to all experts: 
Regarding reliability, the [Daubert] Court identified four factors that 
the district courts might find helpful in assessing the reliability of a 
particular scientific theory or technique as follows:  (1) whether the 
theory can be . . . tested, (2) whether the theory has been subjected to 
peer review and publication, (3) whether the theory has a high known 
or potential rate of error and whether there are standards controlling 
the technique’s operation and (4) whether the technique enjoys general 
acceptance within a relevant scientific community. 
Id. at 984–86 (citation quotations omitted) (footnotes omitted). 
115 Miller & Rein, supra note 114, at 303.  The authors continue by stating “that, ‘[i]f 
scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trial of fact,’ an expert 
‘may testify thereto[]’ . . . .”  Id. at 299 (quoting Daubert v. Merrill Dow Pharmaceuticals, 
Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993)).  See also Alan Charles Raul and Julie Zampa Dwyer, “Regulatory 
Daubert”:  A Proposal to Enhance Judicial Review of Agency Science by Incorporating Daubert 
Principles Into Administrative Law, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 7 (2003).  The authors state 
that Daubert demands that ‘good science’ be fostered in court proceedings and that expert 
testimony which is not grounded in scientific methods and procedures be rejected.  Id.  
“Federal agencies . . . have been widely criticized for lacking a commitment to sound 
science.  Too often, federal courts have upheld agency decisions that are based on faulty 
scientific evidence or unsupported assumptions and conclusions.”  Id.  See also E. Donald 
Elliott, Science, Agencies, and the Courts:  Is Three a Crowd?, 31 ENVTL. L. REP. 10125, 10126 
(2001) (stating that the harms of junk science within agency proceedings demand the 
implementation of a Daubert-style standard). 
116 Miller and Rein, supra note 114, at 299 (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. 579; Kumho Tire Co., 
Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999) (citation omitted)). 
117 526 U.S. 137 (1999).  See Mason, supra note 1, at 892 (stating that gatekeepers are 
expected to separate bad science from good science, i.e., separate the recognized science 
Hubley: The Untouchables: Why a Vocational Expert's Testimony in Social S
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2008
382 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43 
3. Why the Daubert Standard Does Not Apply in Social Security 
Disability Hearings 
In Richardson v. Perales, the Supreme Court considered whether the 
requirements of expert testimony as outlined in Rule 702 applied to 
experts testifying at Social Security disability hearings.118  In Richardson, 
the Court determined that Rule 702 and its requirements do not govern 
the admissibility of evidence in disability hearings.119  Furthermore, 
under 42 U.S.C. § 405(b)(1) and 20 C.F.R. § 404.950(c), it is clear that Rule 
702, and thus Daubert’s interpretation of Rule 702 criteria, does not apply 
to the admission of evidence in Social Security disability hearings.120  As 
mentioned above, the reason for this approach is described by the 
Richardson Court:  the “strict rules of evidence, applicable in the 
courtroom, are not to operate at social security hearings so as to bar the 
admission of evidence otherwise pertinent[.]”121  The Richardson Court 
held that evidence that would be inadmissible in a court proceeding 
                                                                                                             
from the unrecognized science, and that by doing so, a standard of evidentiary reliability 
may be established). 
118 402 U.S. 389 (1971).  In Richardson, the Court held that a written report by a medical 
doctor who examined the claimant and who extrapolated his findings which were limited 
to his area of competence was admissible at the disability hearing, despite its hearsay 
character.  Id. at 402.  The Court held that even though the claimant did not have an 
opportunity to cross examine the doctor about his findings, the doctor’s report may 
constitute substantial evidence supportive of the ALJ’s decision against granting benefits to 
the claimant.  Id.  The Court determined that Congress had granted the Social Security 
Commissioner full power and authority to make regulations and to establish procedures 
necessary to carry out the regulations, and required the Social Security Commissioner to 
adopt reasonable and proper regulations to provide for the nature and extent of the proofs 
and evidence.  Id. at 399–400.  The Court reasoned that the medical report which adversely 
affected the claimant being granted disability benefits was admissible because four other 
medical doctors had participated and had arrived at a similar conclusion.  Id. at 404.  Thus, 
the Court reasoned that the claimant’s due process rights were in no way infringed because 
there were no inconsistencies in the reports of the five specialists.  Id. 
119 Id. at 399; see also Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1218 (9th Cir. 2005).  In Bayliss, the 
court ruled that a foundation for a VE’s testimony was not required.  427 F.3d at 1211.  The 
ALJ’s reliance on VE testimony regarding the number of relevant jobs in the national 
economy was warranted because the ALJ may take administrative notice of any reliable job 
information, including information provided by the VE.  Id. at 1218. 
120 See 42 U.S.C. § 405(b)(1) (2000).  During a hearing, investigation, or other proceeding, 
the SSA Commissioner may administer oaths and affirmations, examine witnesses, and 
receive evidence.  See id.  Evidence may be received at any hearing before the 
Commissioner of Social Security even though it may be inadmissible under rules of 
evidence applicable to court procedure.  See id.  
121 Richardson, 402 U.S. at 400.  The Court reasoned that administrative procedures should 
be understandable to the ordinary claimant and should not be strict in tone and operation.  
Id.  The Court qualified the previous statement by stating that although “[t]his is the 
obvious intent of Congress[,] [it is the case only] so long as the procedures are 
fundamentally fair.”  Id. at 401. 
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could nonetheless constitute substantial evidence supporting a Social 
Security disability determination.122  The Court reasoned that with 
regard to Social Security disability proceedings, “[t]here emerges an 
emphasis upon the informal rather than the formal.”123 
The Richardson Court emphasized that the Social Security disability 
proceeding should be comprehensible to a layman claimant and that the 
proceeding “should be liberal and not strict in tone and operation.”124  
This informal evidentiary approach continued as Daubert’s interpretation 
of Rule 702 and Daubert criteria was used in traditional courtrooms and 
federal agency hearings.125 
Additionally, in Social Security disability proceedings, unlike in 
traditional proceedings, the VE’s recognized expertise provides the 
necessary foundation for his or her testimony; no other requirements 
exist to establish additional foundation for the testimony.126  Because 
                                                 
122 Id. at 400.  In dissent, Justice Douglas stated that “Congress provided in the [SSA] that 
‘[e]vidence may be received at any hearing before the Secretary even though inadmissible 
under rules of evidence applicable to court procedure,’ Congress also provided that 
findings of the Secretary were to be conclusive only ‘if supported by substantial evidence.’” 
Id. at 412–13 (emphasis omitted) (citations omitted).  Furthermore, Justice Douglas pointed 
out that “[u]ncorroborated hearsay untested by cross-examination does not by itself 
constitute ‘substantial evidence.’”  Id. at 413 (citing Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 
U.S. 197, 230 (1938)).  The reason for this was because when a claimant 
testifies as to the nature and extent of his injury and his family doctor 
testifies in his behalf supporting the fact of his disability, the Secretary 
should not be able to support an adverse determination on the basis of 
medical reports from doctors who did not testify or the testimony of an 
HEW employee who never even examined the claimant as a patient. 
Id.  In an attempt to ensure that disability claimants are afforded an adequate level of 
fairness, Justice Douglas pointed out that “[o]ne doctor whose word cast this claimant into 
limbo never saw him, never examined him, never took his vital statistics or saw him try to 
walk or bend or lift weights.”  Id. 
123 Id. at 400; see also WOLFE & POSZEK, supra note 8, at 244 (stating that although judicial 
hearings are strict in form and process, this is not the case for proceedings before ALJs in 
Social Security Disability appeals, because in an attempt to maintain a user-friendly 
atmosphere, the SSA has not promulgated formal rules of proceeding in such hearings). 
124 Richardson, 402 U.S. at 400–01.  The Court continued by determining that it was 
Congress’s intent that the Social Security proceedings be informal as long as the hearings 
were fundamentally fair.  Id. 
125 See id. (explaining that although the formal rules of evidence are not applicable 
because the layman claimant should not be prejudiced by strict guidelines, this does not 
mean that the SSA can permit evidence which is not reliable).  See also WOLFE & POSZEK, 
supra note 8, at 103.  Because the formal rules of evidences are not applicable at disability 
hearings, a concern exists regarding the quality and validity of evidence stemming from 
the absence of a standard that sets forth which evidence is acceptable.  Id. 
126 See Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1218 (9th Cir. 2005).  In Bayliss, the claimant 
argued that the ALJ’s reliance on the VE’s testimony was an error because the evidence of 
the number of relevant jobs in the national economy was not grounded.  Id.  The claimant 
argued that requirements for the admissibility of expert testimony under the Federal Rules 
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Daubert and Rule 702 do not apply to Social Security disability hearings, 
the SSA correspondingly enacted only a minimal standard for VE 
testimony, so as to afford the claimant a fair and just hearing.127 
5. Social Security Administration Policies 
In response to mounting concerns about the reliability of VE 
testimony, the SSA enacted S.S.R. 00-4p as an administrative check on 
the broad credibility granted to VEs.128  S.S.R. 00-4p is essentially an 
administrative or “regulatory Daubert” check on the broad credibility 
granted to vocational experts.129  Under this Ruling, the ALJ is required 
                                                                                                             
of Evidence Rule 702, which were established in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 
Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), do not apply because Rule 702 is inapplicable to SSA proceedings, 
and also because Daubert standards were developed under Rule 702 and therefore do not 
govern the admissibility of evidence before an ALJ in SSA proceedings.  Id.  The court held 
that an ALJ may take administrative notice of any reliable job information, including 
information provided by a VE because the VE’s recognized expertise provides the 
necessary foundation for his testimony.  Id.  “Thus, no additional foundation is required.”  
Id.  But see Miller, supra note 114, at 303 (stating that after Daubert “[n]o longer may a 
federal judge simply ‘defer’ to a proposed expert on the ground that he or she has good 
credentials in a field that is unusual or difficult[]”). 
127 See generally, S.S.R. 00-4p (Dec. 4, 2000), available at www.ssa.gov/OP_Home/rulings/ 
di/02/SSR2000-04-di-02.html (discussing the purpose of S.S.R. 00-4p).  See also D. 
HiepTruong, Daubert and Judicial Review:  How Does An Administrative Agency Distinguish 
Valid Science from Junk Science?, 33 AKRON L. REV. 365 (2000) (stating that with the 
implementation of a Daubert-type standard, Congress would not be second-guessing the 
SSA’s decision making, but rather merely ensuring that the evidence relied upon by the 
agency meets the same threshold requirements to which a federal litigant is already 
subject). 
128 See S.S.R. 00-4p (Dec. 4, 2000), available at www.ssa.gov/OP_Home/rulings/di/02/ 
SSR2000-04-di-02.html.  Because questions have arisen about how the SSA ensures that 
conflicts between data contained in the DOT and testimony proffered by the VE are 
resolved, the SSA enacted S.S.R. 00-4p to clarify its standards for identifying and resolving 
conflicts.  Id.  This policy enactment requires the ALJ to identify and obtain a reasonable 
explanation for conflicts between VE testimony and data contained in the DOT and other 
vocational sources used by the VE.  Id.  Furthermore, the ALJ must explain how any 
conflict was resolved.  Id. 
129 See Kelly, supra note 12, at 471 (stating that some have called for federal agencies to 
implement some form of regulatory Daubert, basically calling for a standard to examine, 
test, or question evidence upon which federal administrative agencies rely); see also 
Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 225 (2002) (stating that the SSA is permitted to formulate 
rules without being burdened by formal rulemaking because the SSA’s complexity, the vast 
number of claimants that it engenders, and the resulting need for agency expertise and 
administrative experience indicate the need for a considerable amount of authority to 
interpret, matters of detail related to the Agency); Miller, supra note 114, at 298 (stating that 
generally courts, when reviewing agency actions, defer to agency expertise on scientific 
and technical issues and affirm the agency so long as the administrative record contains 
some support for the agency’s conclusions and the agency addressed any conflicting issues 
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to act as a gatekeeper by inquiring whether the VE’s testimony adheres 
to data found in the DOT.130  Although the SSA only recently enacted 
S.S.R. 00-4p, the ruling has already been eroded by courts.131 
The erosion continues to occur because courts are divided as to 
whether the failure to inquire into DOT inconsistencies entitles claimants 
to relief.132  In other words, if the ALJ fails to fulfill their gatekeeping 
duty as mandated by S.S.R. 00-4p, the question arises as to whether that 
failure constitutes a reversible error.133 
                                                                                                             
raised during the proceedings); infra Part IV.A.1 (discussing a model Social Security Ruling 
applicable to VEs). 
130 See S.S.R. 00-4p (Dec. 4, 2000), available at www.ssa.gov/OP_Home/rulings/di/02/ 
SSR2000-04-di-02.html (discussing the function and applicability of S.S.R. 00-4p); see also 
supra note 128 (discussing the purpose of S.S.R. 00-4p). 
131 See infra note 201 and accompanying text (discussing how safeguards that ensure 
fairness have been subsequently eroded).  For example, in Morales v. Barnhart, the district 
court found that the ALJ did not comply with S.S.R. 00-4p, but that the ALJ’s failure to 
comply with this Ruling did not mandate either a reversal or remand of the decision and 
that the court may affirm the ALJ’s decision if it was supported by substantial evidence.  
Morales v. Barnhart, No. 06cv0884, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS, 7421, at *11 (9th Cir. Jan. 17, 
2007).  In Morales, the claimant argued that several of the jobs described and testified to by 
the VE were inconsistent with the DOT.  Id. at *12.  The SSA did not dispute Morales’s 
argument, but argued that the VE’s testimony was not entirely inconsistent with the DOT.  
Id.  The SSA specifically asserted that even though the jobs of a storage clerk and a 
furniture rental consultant are not limited to simple, repetitive tasks, the jobs of a counter 
clerk are so limited, and thus there is substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s decision.  Id. 
at 13.  The court held that “although the ALJ did not comply with S.S.R. 00-4p, there is 
substantial evidence to support his decision that Plaintiff is not disabled.”  Id. at 14.  See also 
Renfrow v. Astru, 496 F.3d 918 (8th Cir. 2007) (holding that the ALJ’s error in failing to ask 
the vocational expert whether his testimony regarding the available jobs in the economy 
was consistent with the DOT was harmless); Williams v. Barnhart, 424 F. Supp. 2d 796, 800 
(E.D. Penn. 2006) (citing Rutherford v. Barnhart, 399 F.3d 546, 557 (3d Cir. 2006)) (stating 
that although some inconsistencies existed between the VE’s testimony and the DOT, the 
inconsistencies were not present regarding all jobs that the VE listed); Brown v. Barnhart, 
408 F. Supp. 2d 28, 35 (D.D.C. 2006) (stating that because at least one of the three jobs 
described by the VE was consistent with the DOT and existed in significant numbers in the 
national economy, the ALJ did not error by failing to ask if any conflicts existed, and thus 
this failure to abide by S.S.R. 00-4p did not warrant a reversal).  However, other courts 
have ruled that the ALJ’s failure to comply with S.S.R. 00-4p is not harmless error.  For 
example in Lancaster v. Comm’r of Social Security, the court held that the failure of the ALJ to 
examine the VE’s proffered testimony was not a harmless error because the VE’s testimony 
was unreliable and inconsistencies existed between the VE’s testimony and the DOT.  228 
F. App’x 563, 577 (2007).  In Lancaster, the court decided that two mistakes—the 
inconsistencies with the VE’s testimony and the undermining of the treating physician’s 
medical opinion—amounted to serious error.  Id. 
132 See infra note 135 and accompanying text (discussing the three avenues courts have 
taken in interpreting S.S.R. 00-4p (Dec. 4, 2000)). 
133 See S.S.R. 00-4p (Dec. 4, 2000), available at www.ssa.gov/OP_Home/rulings/di/02/ 
SSR2000-04-di-02.html (discussing the function and applicability of S.S.R. 00-4p). 
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Courts have taken three avenues:  first, some courts have ruled that 
the ALJ’s failure to fulfill the gatekeeping role by S.S.R. 00-4p does not 
constitute a reversible error; second, other courts have held that failure to 
comply with S.S.R. 00-4p constitutes a reversible error; third, other courts 
have taken a middle ground approach by holding that whether failure to 
follow the mandate of S.S.R. 00-4p constitutes reversible error depends 
on the degree of the failure and the circumstances surrounding the 
decision.134  Viewing the three approaches as a whole, it is evident that 
the SSA still requires compliance with S.S.R 00-4p and that non-
compliance is not always harmless error.135 
Because the VE relies on the unreliable and obsolete DOT, and 
because there are no particularized standards regulating the VEs, the 
integrity of VE testimony and the SSA’s entire disability determination 
process is brought into question.136  Additionally, without testimony 
                                                 
134 See Steward v. Barnhart, 44 F. App’x 151, 152 (2002) (finding that the claimant was 
entitled to relief because all three jobs that the VE stated that the claimant could perform 
were in conflict with the DOT); see also Lancaster v. Comm’r of Social Sec., 228 F. App’x 563, 
577 (2007) (finding that the ALJ did not ensure the lack of conflict and holding that the 
ALJ’s failure to carry the burden at the fifth step was a reversible error).  But see 
Teverbaugh v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 258 F. Supp. 2d 702, 705 (E.D. Mich. 2003) (discussing 
how the Social Security Commissioner did not dispute that the ALJ failed to question the 
VE regarding whether the jobs that the VE identified as consistent with the claimant’s RFC 
conflicted with the DOT).  The court in Lancaster stated: 
Other courts have found that claimants should not be permitted to 
scan the record for implied or unexplained conflicts between the 
specific testimony of an expert witness and the voluminous provisions 
of the DOT, and then present that conflict as reversible error, when the 
conflict was not deemed sufficient to merit adversarial development in 
the administrative hearing.  Adopting a middle ground approach, in 
which neither the DOT nor the vocational expert testimony is per se 
controlling, permits a more straightforward approach. 
228 F. App’x 563 at 574 (citations omitted). 
135 An example of the importance of complying with S.S.R. 00-4p is evident in Prochaska v. 
Barnhart, 454 F.3d 731 (7th Cir. 2006).  In Prochaska, the claimant had a back impairment, 
was obese, and offered evidence of mental impairments.  Id. at 735.  The ALJ found that her 
allegations were not credible and, accordingly, denied her claim at the fifth step.  Id.  
However, the ALJ failed to ask the VE whether the VE’s testimony was consistent with 
information in the DOT.  Id.  The court remanded the case upon finding that the ALJ did 
not comply with S.S.R. 00-4p and that the error was not harmless.  Id. at 731.  The SSA 
argued that, with respect to a significant number of jobs, no inconsistency existed between 
the VE’s testimony and the DOT.  Id. at 735.  The court concluded, however, that it could 
not determine whether the testimony was consistent with the DOT and that the ALJ should 
have resolved that issue with the VE.  Id. at 736.  Indeed, it is evident that the ALJ must 
comply with S.S.R. 00-4p and that any inconsistencies between the VE’s testimony and the 
DOT must be addressed by the ALJ.  See id. 
136 See supra note 5 and accompanying text (discussing whether the integrity of the 
disability adjudication system has been compromised); see also supra note 4 and 
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from VEs and reliance on the DOT, the SSA disability determination 
process crumbles.137  Thus, because the validity of the VE’s testimony has 
been compromised, the entire SSA disability determination process is 
susceptible to collapse.138 
In an attempt to address concerns about the validity of VE testimony 
and reliance on the DOT, Part III addresses the practical effect of 
applying a Daubert-type standard to VE testimony in the SSA’s disability 
adjudication system.  By applying this standard as proposed in Part IV, 
the SSA will ensure that the integrity of its disability adjudication system 
remains intact, and that the claimant is afforded an adequate level of 
protection against arbitrary and capricious testimony.139 
III.  ANALYSIS 
Justice cannot be achieved without the presumption that the legal process is 
finding truth.140 
 
Testimony from a VE serves a crucial role in disability proceedings 
because it has potential to help the ALJ discover whether the claimant is 
entitled to disability benefits.141  Due to the importance of this testimony, 
                                                                                                             
accompanying text (discussing how the SSA previously dealt with the problem of VE 
testimony at disability proceedings). 
137 See supra note 4 and accompanying text (discussing how, without reliable vocational 
evidence, the fourth and fifth steps of the sequential evaluation process would be 
compromised); see also infra Parts IV.A.1–3 (discussing how the integrity of the disability 
process can be protected by promulgating a Ruling that incorporates a Daubert-type 
standard applicable to VEs that includes qualifications requirements for VEs, as well as, a 
mandate that VEs rely upon only reliable, complete, and up-to-date occupational data and 
sources). 
138 See supra note 1 and accompanying text (discussing the importance of maintaining the 
authority upon which conclusions are based in order to ensure that justice is maintained); 
see also infra Part IV.A (illustrating a model Ruling that would ensure that disability 
claimants are afforded a certain level of fairness through the implementation of defined 
standards applicable to VEs employed by the SSA). 
139 See infra Parts IV.A.1–3 (discussing how the promulgation of a Social Security Ruling 
applicable to VEs will bring credibility and stability to the SSA’s disability determination 
process, while also ensuring that disability claimants are protected from arbitrary and 
capricious vocational evidence). 
140 Mason, supra note 1, at 906 (discussing the foundation upon which empirical data is 
based and how if that foundation is compromised the authority of the conclusions will be 
undermined).  
141 See supra note 2 and accompanying text (discussing how the VE and the DOT play a 
crucial role in disability proceedings because of the potential to discover the truth about 
whether the claimant is disabled); see also McKinnie v. Barnhart, 368 F.3d 907, 910 (7th Cir. 
2004) (stating that in social security disability cases, the ALJ may depend on the VE’s 
testimony to find the claimant disabled or not disabled); S.S.R. 00-4p (Dec. 4, 2000), available 
at www.ssa.gov/OP_Home/rulings/di/02/SSR2000-04-di-02.html (discussing when an 
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any evidentiary-admissibility standard should consider the testimony’s 
potential to acquaint the ALJ with the truth.142 
When adopting the SSA’s current standard regarding VEs, the 
government had to be mindful of two concerns.143  First, an all-
encompassing, efficient process that accounts for the wide range of 
possible alleged disabilities, while also deterring abuse of disability 
benefits is crucial to the management of the largest adjudication system 
in the world.144  Second, the fundamental notions of fairness and 
government accountability are also crucial to any adjudication system, 
especially one that has such a significant impact on a large portion of 
United States citizens.145  If the SSA is free to justify its policy preferences 
based on testimony that may lack integrity, the SSA’s accountability—
along with the lives of millions of disability claimants—will be adversely 
affected.146 
Like any governmental agency with an adjudication system that has 
its power vested in the United States Constitution, the SSA is obligated 
to adhere to grounded and reliable testimony from its experts.147  If VEs 
                                                                                                             
ALJ can rely upon a VE during the disability determination process); supra note 55 and 
accompanying text (discussing that the complexity of the vocational field requires the use 
of an expert). 
142 See supra note 1 and accompanying text (discussing the importance of how an 
admissibility standard ought to consider the potential of a piece of evidence to acquaint a 
judge with the truth). 
143 See supra note 9 and accompanying text (discussing the SSA’s current standard 
regarding VEs and VE testimony); see also infra Part IV.A.1–3 (discussing how these two 
concerns can be addressed while ensuring that a balance between efficiency and fairness). 
144 See Hu et al., supra note 6, at 10 (stating that the SSA has to process and adjudicate 
claims as consistently, expeditiously, and cost effectively as possible); see also infra note 179 
and accompanying text (discussing the need to reach a balance between SSA efficiency and 
the level of fairness afforded the claimant); infra Part IV.A.1–3 (discussing that when the 
integrity of the disability process is compromised due to unreliable vocational evidence, 
the balance favors SSA efficiency over the level of fairness afforded to the claimaint). 
145 See Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 412 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting).  When a 
federal bureaucracy treats an individual unjustly, it is a matter of concern to all people.  Id. 
at 412.  Such a system must be fair, and it must work.  Id. at 399.  See also Hu et al., supra 
note 6, at 10 (stating that with the SSA accepting approximately 2.5 million applications per 
year, the SSA’s budgetary and welfare implications are undeniable). 
146 See TRAVER, supra note 2, § 1302 (discussing that currently no standards exist to 
regulate VE methodologies); see also Hu et al., supra note 6, at 11 (discussing how the SSA 
has aggressively and successfully defended its adjudication process, which has, in 
principle, been endorsed by Congress and by courts). 
147 See McKinnie v. Barnhart, 368 F.3d 907, 910 (7th Cir. 2004) (stating that the vocational 
expert’s testimony can only be relied on if it is reliable).  In McKinnie, the court held that the 
ALJ erred by not requiring the vocational expert to produce data and evidence to support 
her opinion.  Id. at 911.  The VE testified with vague responses to the claimaint’s questions, 
and she also failed to substantiate her findings with a written report or other 
documentation to substantiate her figures.  Id. 
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are required to do something that none of them are qualified as 
economists to do—statistically breaking down the source data to 
estimate the number of jobs available in the appropriate categories of the 
DOT—then the resulting testimony could hardly be considered 
grounded and reliable.148 
If the SSA bases its disability determination on testimony that is not 
grounded in acceptable standards of scientific inquiry or on the best 
empirical data available, then the SSA should not be allowed to rely on 
these experts.149  An expert who—either due to lack of experience, 
education, or simply because the sources are inadequate—manipulates 
either the data or the process to reach a desired outcome should not be 
relied on because his extrapolations are mere ipse dixit.150  As the Court 
held in Donahue v. Barnhart, “[e]vidence is not ‘substantial’ if vital 
testimony has been conjured out of whole cloth.”151 
This dilemma could be avoided with an adequate standard.152  For 
example, because the main purpose of Daubert in the federal agency 
context is “to encourage reviewing judges to be less deferential, and thus 
more probing, of agency science and related administrative justifications 
for regulatory action[,]”153 it seems logical that the implementation of a 
                                                 
148 See Traver, supra note 75 (arguing that if the vocational expert is not qualified to 
perform job analysis, or if the vocational expert has not used job analysis standards 
applicable to the vocational profession, then the testimony should be rejected); see also 
TRAVER, supra note 2, § 1900.1 (discussing that the VE needs to be both a placement 
specialist and a labor market specialist whose experiences provide the necessary 
competency to assist the ALJ in the adjudicative process). 
149 See Mason, supra note 1, at 905 (stating that some science and methodologies are better 
than other science and methodologies in the search for objective truth); see also TRAVER, 
supra note 2, § 1900.1 (stating that it is nearly impossible to attempt to show that the VE 
does not meet Social Security’s minimum standards to be a VE, as those standards are 
practically nonexistent). 
150 See McKinnie, 368 F.3d at 910 (holding that without first inquiring into the reliability of 
the VE’s opinions, the ALJ should not have so unquestioningly accepted the VE’s testimony 
that a significant number of jobs were available to the claimant, where the claimant 
contested the reliability of the VE’s conclusions); see also Zenith Elecs. Corp. v. WH-TV 
Broad Corp., 395 F.3d 416, 420 (7th Cir. 2005) (stating that when an expert did not base his 
opinions on data from comparable markets and instead relied upon his general expertise 
and curriculum vitae, his extrapolations were mere ipse dixit). 
151 Donahue v. Barnhart, 279 F.3d 441, 446 (7th Cir. 2002) (citing Peabody Coal Co. v. 
McCandless, 255 F.3d 465 (7th Cir. 2001); Elliott v. CFTC, 202 F.3d 926 (7th Cir. 2000)). 
152 See infra Part IV.A (discussing how the implementation of a Social Security Ruling 
regarding vocational experts will bring credibility and stability to the disability hearing); 
see also infra Part IV.A (illustrating a model rule applicable to VEs that would ensure the 
integrity of the disability determination process). 
153 See Raul & Dwyer, supra note 115, at 8 (arguing for the implementation of a Daubert-
type standard within Environmental Protection Agency proceedings).  But see Wendy 
Wagner, Importing Daubert to Administrative Agencies Through the Information Quality Act, 12 
J.L. & POL’Y 589, 600–12 (2004) (explaining how implementing Daubert will greatly hinder 
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Daubert-type standard would be beneficial to the SSA because it would 
allow institutional credibility to remain intact and the notion of fairness 
to be preserved.154 
Part III.A of this Note analyzes the SSA’s reliance upon the 
testimony of VEs and whether S.S.R. 00-4p is a sufficient safeguard.155  
Part III.B examines the level of fairness owed to the claimant by the SSA; 
in particular, this Part examines jurisprudence stipulating the degree of 
due process afforded to the claimant.156  Part III.C analyzes the 
possibility of implementing a Daubert-type standard applicable to VE 
testimony to ensure that the claimant is afforded an adequate level of 
fairness.157 
A. The Vocational Expert, the Foundational Source, and the Administrative 
Safeguard:  The Vocational Expert’s Use of the Dictionary of Occupational 
Titles and Social Security Ruling 00-4p 
All experts should have some foundational source upon which to 
base their empirical conclusions.158  For VEs in SSA disability 
proceedings, this foundational source is, among other occupational 
sources, the DOT.159  However, as mentioned previously, the DOT is 
outdated and obsolete; indeed, relying on this source and its 
methodology is hardly reliable.160 
The idea that VEs should use reliable methods is not necessarily 
grounded in Rule 702; rather, it is based in the SSA’s process that 
                                                                                                             
policy decisions, by challenging the agency’s data while also imposing a greater 
informational burden on agencies and slowing down the administrative process). 
154 See supra note 114 and accompany text (discussing the benefits of implementing a 
regulatory Daubert); see also Raul & Dwyer, supra note 115, at 8 (stating that implementing a 
Daubert-type standard into administrative law would improve agency decision making and 
enhance accountability); infra Part IV.A.1 (discussing the promulgation of a new Ruling 
that incorporates a Daubert-type standard applicable to VEs engaged by the SSA). 
155 See infra Part III.A (analyzing VEs and the basis upon which a VE’s testimony is 
founded, namely, the DOT). 
156 See infra Part III.B (analyzing the level of fairness afforded to the disability claimant). 
157 See infra Part III.C (analyzing the Daubert standard and whether it would be beneficial 
to hold VEs to that standard). 
158 See supra note 1 and accompanying text (discussing that the authority upon which a 
conclusion is based depends upon the mode in which the conclusion was reached); see also 
Zenith Elecs. Corp. v. WH-TV Broad, Corp., 395 F.3d 416, 420 (7th Cir. 2005) (stating that 
general expertise is not sufficient to support an expert’s conclusions).   
159 See supra note 2 and accompanying text (discussing how a VE’s main source relied 
upon for occupational data (the DOT) and the SSA’s reliance upon that data is the keystone 
in the arch that supports the entire vocational framework of the SSA). 
160 See supra note 75 (discussing the antiquity of the DOT); see also infra Part IV.A.3 
(discussing why a need exists to promulgate a Ruling that mandates the use of only reliable, 
complete, and up-to-date occupational data and sources). 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 43, No. 1 [2008], Art. 8
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol43/iss1/8
2008] Social Security Disability Hearings 391 
requires every decision to be supported by substantial evidence.161  If the 
VE’s testimony has been conjured out of “whole cloth[,]” then it is not 
substantial and should be attacked by the claimant.162 
The SSA anticipated these problems and responded by enacting 
S.S.R. 00-4p, which mandates that when the VE provides evidence about 
the requirements of a job, the ALJ is obligated to ask about any possible 
conflict between that evidence and the information provided in the 
DOT.163  Although this response adds a much needed safeguard and 
heightens the evidentiary standard pertaining to VE testimony, this 
solution is only a superficial band-aid on a gaping wound because the 
reliance on the DOT could hardly be considered good science in the 
courtroom and would in many instances be rejected as unreliable 
evidence under Daubert.164  Thus, the SSA’s attempt to self-regulate by 
implementing S.S.R. 00-4p seems superficial.165 
One of the weaknesses of S.S.R. 00-4p is that most ALJs rely on the 
vocational expert’s conclusion because the ALJ obviously lacks the 
knowledge, expertise, or education in making conclusions relating to the 
claimant’s ability to perform jobs that exist in significant numbers in the 
economy.166  If the ALJ was an expert in the vocational field, there would 
be no need for the VE to participate in the disability determination 
                                                 
161 See Donahue v. Barnhart, 279 F.3d 441, 446 (7th Cir. 2002). 
162  See supra note 151 and accompanying text (discussing substantial evidence); see also 
Donahue, 279 F.3d at 446 (stating that without substantial evidence supporting it, the 
testimony is merely conjured out of “whole cloth”); see also Solomon, supra note 9, at 215 
(stating that the standard argument that a claimant makes against the VE is that the VE is 
merely using anecdotal experiences rather than scientific fact).  
163 See supra note 128 and accompanying text (discussing the purpose and requirements 
of S.S.R. 00-4p); see also infra Part IV.A (discussing the need for a new Ruling directed at 
VEs to ensure that the integrity of the disability determination system is not compromised). 
164 See supra note 115 and accompanying text (discussing what constitutes good science 
under a Daubert standard); see also TRAVER, supra note 2, § 1403.1.1.  Even though the SSA 
maintains that the supposed “‘experts’ are ‘reliable[,]’ there is no evaluation process, 
testing, certification, or other mechanism in place to ensure their reliability.  With no 
vetting process in place, how does the Commissioner know her experts are ‘reliable?’”  
TRAVER, supra note 2, § 1403.1.1.  In most instances, the ALJ will not know that 
inconsistencies exist between the VE’s testimony and the DOT, and therefore, relying on 
the VE to state whether there are any inconsistencies creates an inherent conflict of interest.  
Id. 
165 See TRAVER, supra note 2, at § 1403.1.1 (discussing how “Rule 00-4p’s claim of 
reliability is just a bit of puffery in the adjudication process[]”). 
166 See S.S.R. 00-4p (Dec. 4, 2000), available at www.ssa.gov/OP_Home/rulings/di/02/ 
SSR2000-04-di-02.html (discussing why the ALJ relies upon a VE during the hearing).  
Clearly, this is why there is a need for vocational experts.  Id.  If ALJs had training and 
expertise in the vocational field, vocational experts would not be needed because the ALJ 
could easily and accurately make a conclusion based on the claimant’s assigned RFC and 
the jobs that exist in significant numbers in the economy.  Id. 
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process.  To rely on the ALJ to investigate whether the VE’s conclusion is 
reliable defeats the purpose of protecting the claimant from 
extrapolations that are merely ipse dixit.167  Furthermore, to require that 
the claimant raise an objection to the conclusions of the VE at the 
disability hearing seems contradictory to the purpose of S.S.R. 00-4p, 
which assigns this task to the ALJ.  Thus, courts have held that when the 
VE’s reasoning is not questioned, the ALJ is entitled to accept the VE’s 
conclusion.168 
Taking into consideration multiple methodologies adopted by VEs 
that purport to offer data about the number of jobs that exist in the 
economy, these implications (e.g., that VEs lack the necessary education, 
knowledge, or experience), if not resolved, will greatly undermine the 
integrity of the SSA’s disability proceedings.169  In addition, the court in 
Donahue held that a VE is free to give a bottom-line conclusion, provided 
that the underlying occupational data and reasoning are available on 
demand.170  This holding grants even broader authority to the VE, which 
is bound to give rise to a VE failing to come to the hearing with 
documentation and underlying occupational data to support his 
conclusions.171  Moreover, the court in McKinnie v. Barnhart held that the 
ALJ erred in not requiring the VE to produce the data and evidence that 
supported the VE’s extrapolations, where the VE failed to substantiate 
her conclusions with a written report or other documentation forming a 
basis for her conclusions.172  Indeed, it is clear that S.S.R. 00-4p has 
                                                 
167 See Traver, supra note 75; see also S.S.R. 00-4p (Dec. 4, 2000), available at 
www.ssa.gov/OP_Home/rulings/di/02/SSR2000-04-di-02.html (explaining why and 
when the ALJ can rely upon a VE during the disability determination process). 
168 Donahue v. Barnhart, 279 F.3d 441, 446 (7th Cir. 2002) (stating that if no one questions 
the VE’s foundation or reasoning, an ALJ is entitled to accept the vocational expert’s 
conclusion, even if that conclusion differs from the DOT). 
169 See TRAVER, supra note 2, § 1403.1.  The SSA’s reliance upon the VE and the DOT is the 
foundation of the fourth and fifth steps; thus the VE’s testimony, which is based upon the 
DOT, is the deciding factor in the outcome of millions of disability claims each year.  Id.  If 
this foundation is undermined, then the entire system loses its validity.  Id.  See also Joint 
Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 171 (1951) (stating that “[t]he 
validity and moral authority of a conclusion largely depend on the mode by which . . . [the 
conclusion] was reached[]”).  But see Hu et al., supra note 6, at 11 (stating that the SSA has 
aggressively and successfully defended the adjudication process). 
170 Donahue, 279 F.3d at 446 (citing FED. R. EVID. 704(a)) (stating that a VE is free to render 
only a bottom-line determination, provided that the underlying data and reasoning are 
available on demand). 
171 See Solomon, supra note 9, at 209 (stating that VEs should have a valid basis for their 
testimony, which consists of not only relying on the DOT but also other labor market 
surveys and reference materials).  
172 368 F.3d 907, 910 (7th Cir. 2004). 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 43, No. 1 [2008], Art. 8
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol43/iss1/8
2008] Social Security Disability Hearings 393 
eroded as an administrative check on the broad credibility granted to 
VEs.173 
The problem revolves around proper standards regarding VEs, their 
methodologies, and the sources upon which they base their 
conclusions.174  If the standard regarding VEs was heightened, the 
number of occasions that a VE who is not qualified to perform 
occupational analysis would be reduced.175  If these occasions were 
reduced, then the fear of the VE’s testimony adversely affecting the level 
of fairness afforded the claimant would be greatly diminished.176 
B. A Need for a Standard Applicable to Vocational Experts That Will Ensure 
the Claimant is Afforded an Adequate Level of Fairness:  Examining 
Jurisprudence Stipulating the Degree of Fairness Afforded to the Claimant 
With the seemingly high degree of deference given to the ALJ with 
regard to evidentiary matters and the relatively broad credibility granted 
to the VE’s testimony, the question bound to arise is whether an 
adequate level of fairness is afforded disability claimants.177  In 
Richardson, the Court mandated that evidence not normally admissible in 
regular court proceedings could constitute substantial evidence in 
                                                 
173 See supra note 129 and accompanying text (discussing the erosion of S.S.R. 00-4p (Dec. 
4, 2000)); see also infra Part IV.A (discussing the practical effect of promulgating a new 
Social Security Ruling directed at VEs and the resulting safeguards of such a Ruling). 
174 See supra note 114 and accompany text (discussing the practical effects of 
implementing a Daubert-type evidentiary standard); see also infra Part IV.A.1–3 (discussing 
what a model Ruling applicable to VEs might look like). 
175 TRAVER, supra note 2, § 1403.1.  No longer would disability claimants be subject to the 
SSA’s belief that the DOT and its related data are better than nothing.  Id.; see also infra Part 
IV.A.2 (discussing the positive benefits of promulgating a Ruling that includes qualification 
requirements for VEs engaged by the SSA). 
176 See generally 70 Fed. Reg. 43589 (July 27, 2005).  The previous Commissioner stated 
that the SSA would study the issue of occupational information with the announcement 
made in the Federal Register.  Id.  But see TRAVER, supra note 2, § 1403.1 (stating that “as of 
October 1, 2007, the SSA continues to [use] [sic] the DOT . . . ”). 
177 See supra note 105 and accompanying text (discussing whether an adequate level of 
fairness is afforded to the claimant); see also 42 U.S.C. § 405(a) (2000) (stating that the Social 
Security Commissioner shall have full power and authority to make rules and regulations 
and to establish procedures necessary to carry out such regulations, and that the Social 
Security Commissioner shall adopt reasonable and proper regulations to provide for the 
nature and extent of proof, evidence, and the method of taking and furnishing the same in 
order to establish the claimant’s right to Social Security disability benefits); Id. § 405(b) 
(2000) (stating that evidence may be admissible at Social Security disability hearings even 
though it is inadmissible under the rules of evidence that are applicable to court 
procedure); infra Part IV.A (discussing the promulgation of a model Social Security Ruling 
that would ensure that the disability claimant is provided a certain level of fairness, 
thereby protecting the claimant’s due process rights). 
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disability hearings.178  One of the justifications for this holding was that 
the disability hearings should be understandable for the layman 
claimant, but the Court could have hardly meant that relaxation of 
evidentiary rules in disability hearings was meant to relax any obligation 
of fairness owed to the disability claimant.179  The Court’s holding that 
the medical report was admissible was not based on the notion of the 
rules being relaxed, but instead on the fact that four other medical 
experts had arrived at the same conclusion.180 
Richardson arguably would have been decided differently if the 
medical expert’s report instead would have been an occupational report 
completed by a VE who was not qualified (to manipulate job data and 
identify components of job groups provided by the various vocational 
sources), and whose field was a relatively new science.181  The Court in 
Richardson arguably would have been more concerned about an 
infringement of procedural due process afforded to disability 
claimants.182  But what has been perceived as a victory for disability 
claimants actually hinders the level of protection granted to the 
claimants from unqualified VEs or conclusions arrived at by mere 
extrapolations which are ipse dixit.183 
                                                 
178 See Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 400 (1971) (holding that the strict rules of 
evidence, applicable in the courtroom, do not bar the admission of otherwise pertinent 
evidence at social security disability hearings). 
179 Id. at 401.  The right to Social Security benefits is earned, and the extent to which 
procedural due process must be afforded is influenced by the extent to which the claimant 
may be condemned to suffer a grievous loss.  Id.  But “when a grave injustice is wreaked on 
an individual by the presently powerful federal bureaucracy, it is a matter of concern to 
everyone[] . . . .”  Id. at 413 (Douglas, J., dissenting); see also MILLS, supra note 1, at 2 
(discussing how the SSA’s priority is to quickly and efficiently process disability 
applications and hearings); infra Parts IV.A.1–3 (discussing that when the integrity of the 
disability process is compromised due to unreliable vocational evidence, the balance 
between SSA efficiency and the level of fairness afforded to the claimaint favors SSA 
efficiency). 
180 Richardson, 402 U.S. at 402. 
181 TRAVER, supra note 2, § 1403.1 (discussing how VE testimony lacks validity because it 
is based on the outdated DOT and because of the lack of standards that VEs must satisify in 
order to testify at SSA hearings); see also supra note 10 and accompanying text (discussing 
how the vocational field is a relatively new discipline); infra Parts IV.A.1–3 (discussing the 
benefits of promulgating a Ruling to ensure that disability claimants are protected from 
arbitrary and capricious vocational evidence). 
182 See supra note 75 and accompanying text (discussing the lack of qualifications that VEs 
have relative to statistical evaluation); see also Part IV.A.2 (discussing how the 
promulgation of a Ruling mandating that VEs meet certain qualification standards, 
including statistical or economical evaluation experience, would ensure that vocational 
evidence is reliable). 
183 See McKinnie v. Barnhart, 368 F.3d 907, 910 (7th Cir. 2004) (discussing how 
manipulating either the data or the process to reach a desired outcome is not reliable 
because the extrapolations are merely ipse dixit); see also Victor G. Rosenblum, The Right to 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 43, No. 1 [2008], Art. 8
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol43/iss1/8
2008] Social Security Disability Hearings 395 
Subsequently, courts have interpreted the relaxed evidentiary 
standards in SSA proceedings to mean that heightened standards for 
vocational experts are not necessary.184  For example, in Bayliss v. 
Barnhart, the Court declared that the VE’s expertise establishes the 
necessary foundation for his testimony, and so, no additional foundation 
is necessary.185  In Bayliss, the claimant argued that the requirements for 
admissibility of expert testimony under Rule 702, established in Daubert 
should apply to the testimony of the VE.186  However, the Bayliss Court 
determined that because the Daubert decision rested on the interpretation 
of Rule 702, the safeguard implications established in Daubert, and 
subsequently extended to all expert testimony via Kumho Tire Co. v. 
Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999), did not govern the admissibility of 
evidence before the ALJ in SSA proceedings.187 
In Donahue v. Barnhart, the Court held that although Rule 702 does 
not apply to SSA proceedings, the notion that VEs should use reliable 
methods does not depend on Rule 702 because the Social Security 
proceedings require every decision to be supported by substantial 
evidence.188  Additionally, the Court pointed out that “[e]vidence is not 
‘substantial’ if vital testimony has been conjured out of whole cloth.”189 
These cases suggest two propositions:  first, in part because of 
Richardson, Rule 702 and subsequently the safeguard implications of 
Daubert do not apply; and second, the foundation requirements of the 
VE’s expertise are not uniformly established.190  The interpretations of 
                                                                                                             
Cross-Examine Physicians in Social Security Disability Cases, 20 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. 
JUDGES 317, 318 (2000) (discussing how Richardson v. Perales was first interpreted as 
granting procedural safeguards to disability claimants and was subsequently interpreted as 
a rejection of those safeguards). 
184 See Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211 (9th Cir. 2005). 
185 See supra note 60 and accompanying text (discussing how the VE’s expertise provides 
the necessary foundation for his or her testimony); see also Bayliss, 427 F.3d at 1218. 
186 See Bayliss, 427 F.3d at 1218.  The court cited 42 U.S.C. § 405(b)(1) and Richardson, 
holding that the ALJ may receive evidence even though the evidence would not be 
admissible in court.  Id. 
187 Id. at 1218 n.4. 
188 See Donahue v. Barnhart, 279 F.3d 441, 446 (7th Cir. 2002). 
189 Id.  Interestingly, even though the court declared that Rule 702 does not apply, the 
court later cited to Rule 704(a), holding that a VE is free to give a bottom line 
determination, provided that the underlying data and reasoning are available on demand.  
Id. 
190 See supra note 153 and accompanying text (discussing the benefits of implementing a 
regulatory Daubert); see also Elliott, supra note 115, at 10126 (stating that the harms of junk 
science within agency proceedings demand appropriate gatekeeping); supra note 10 and 
accompanying text (discussing how there is a lack of uniformity regarding the foundational 
requirements of vocational experts).  But see WAGNER, supra note 153, at 600–12 (discussing 
the dangers of Daubert in the Administrative sector, noting that Daubert will adversely 
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Richardson somehow seem flawed because a system that was meant to be 
informal to benefit the layman claimant should not be allowed to relax 
the level of fairness the system owes to the claimant.191  Moreover, the 
rejection of a Daubert-like standard to VEs does not seem justified.192  
Applying a Daubert-like standard would not adversely affect the 
substantial evidence requirement.193  Rather, it would ensure the 
integrity of the administration of the system by permitting only qualified 
experts, whose testimony is based on sufficient and updated data that is 
formulated through the use of reliable and accepted principles.194 
C. Why the Vocational Expert Should Be Held to a Daubert-Type Standard 
In Donahue, Judge Easterbrook asked the opposing parties at oral 
argument what makes a VE an “expert” and “where [does] the 
information in the [DOT] c[o]me from[].”195  Not surprisingly, both 
parties “did not know.”196  This predicament would not exist if the SSA 
adopted a Daubert-type standard.197  Implementing a Daubert-type 
approach would ensure the following:  (1) that all VEs adhere to reliable 
methodologies and data to support their findings; (2) that the level of 
fairness afforded to claimants is not jeopardized because of questionable 
testimony from VEs; (3) that uniformity exists within the SSA disability 
                                                                                                             
affect policy decisions because it requires increased scrutiny of data and imposition of a 
greater burden on agencies to provide better information pertaining to its holdings). 
191 See supra note 179 and accompanying text (discussing how the extent to which 
procedural due process must be afforded is influenced by the extent to which the claimant 
may be condemned to suffer a grievous loss); see also infra Part IV.A (discussing that when 
the integrity of the disability process is compromised due to unreliable vocational 
evidence, the balance between SSA efficiency and the level of fairness afforded to the 
claimant favors SSA efficiency). 
192 See supra note 115 and accompanying text (discussing the lack of justification for not 
implementing a Daubert-type standard for VEs within disability proceedings); see also 
Elliott, supra note 115, at 10126 (stating that the harms of junk science in agency 
proceedings demand appropriate gatekeeping). 
193 See supra note 154 and accompanying text (discussing the impact that regulatory 
Daubert would have on the agency). 
194 See supra note 110 and accompanying text (quoting FED. R. EVID. 702) (discussing how 
an expert witness may testify when the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, the 
testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and the witness has applied 
the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case); see also infra Part IV.A. 
(presenting a model Social Security Ruling that incorporates aspects of Rule 702 under the 
guise of a Daubert-type standard). 
195 Donahue v. Barnhart, 279 F.3d 441, 445–46 (7th Cir. 2002). 
196 Id. at 446 (emphasis added). 
197 See Miller & Rein, supra note 114, at 299 (quoting Daubert v. Merrell Dow 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993)) (stating that Daubert required judges to 
determine whether a proffered expert opinion is both reliable and relevant, i.e. whether it 
isbased on knowledge derived from a valid scientific method). 
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proceedings; and (4) that integrity in the fourth and fifth steps of the 
sequential evaluation process is maintained.198 
The claimant seeking disability benefits is entitled to a certain level 
of fairness, which “is applicable to the adjudicative [and] administrative 
proceeding involving ‘differing rules of fair play,[’] . . . and . . . [to] the 
‘extent to which procedural due process must be afforded[,] the recipient 
is influenced by the extent to which he may be ‘condemned to suffer 
grievous loss’.’”199  The claimant who is denied disability benefits stands 
to suffer a grave loss (i.e., the loss of funds to sustain a meager living and 
funds to treat the severe impairment that hinders the ability to work), 
while the burden placed on the SSA is merely a more rigorous standard 
for its VEs, which would not adversely affect the substantial evidence 
standard, but rather complement it.200 
Furthermore, S.S.R. 00-4p already mandates that the ALJ act as a 
gatekeeper by requiring that the ALJ inquire into whether there are any 
inconsistencies between the VE’s testimony and the foundational source 
(e.g., the DOT).201  Extending the other safeguards of Daubert to address 
the problem of questionable VE testimony due to a VE’s lack of statistical 
evaluation expertise, unreliable methodologies, or outdated source of 
occupational data, would not significantly burden the SSA.  Indeed, any 
burden to the SSA would be outweighed only by the fact that the 
grievous loss typically suffered by the disability claimant would be 
averted.202  Implementing a regulatory Daubert approach will force the 
                                                 
198 See supra note 154 and accompanying text (discussing the benefits of implementing a 
Daubert-type standard); see also BUSH, supra note 39, § 340 (discussing how there is a lack of 
uniformity regarding the foundational requirements of vocational experts); supra note 179 
(discussing the Court’s balancing test which balances the claimant’s level of loss and the 
burden placed on the government to implement safeguards); infra Part IV.A.1 (discussing 
how implementation of a Daubert-type standard will assure institutional integrity). 
199 Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401–02 (1971) (citing Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 
442 (1960); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262–63 (1970)); see also supra note 12 and 
accompanying text (discussing the level of loss that disabled and disadvantaged claimants 
potentially face). 
200 See supra note 179 and accompanying text (discussing how the benefits of 
implementing additional safeguards to protect the claimant from suffering a grievous loss 
is not outweighed by the burden of implementing a Daubert-style approach in addition to 
the already established S.S.R. 00-4p); see also infra Part IV.B (discussing the benefits of 
enacting a Ruling applicable to VEs that incorporates a Daubert-type standard). 
201 See supra note 131 and accompanying text (discussing the benefits and shortcomings 
of S.S.R. 00-4p and how this ruling has been eroded); see also infra Part IV.A.1–3 (discussing 
why there is a need for promulgating a new ruling that is applicable to VEs). 
202 See supra note 106 and accompanying text (discussing the unreliability of the VE’s 
testimony because the VE lacks qualifications in statistical evaluation); see also Richardson 
v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (discussing the Court’s balancing test which balances the 
claimant’s level of loss and the burden placed on the government in implementing 
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SSA to better explain itself and better document its findings, thus 
ensuring that the claimant is afforded an adequate level of fairness and 
the integrity of the Social Security disability proceedings remains 
intact.203 
The issue comes down to fairness.204  Although the SSA is the largest 
adjudication system in the world and considers millions of applications a 
year, this should not exempt it from complying with the fundamental 
notion of fairness.205  The SSA has implemented a regulation that 
mandates the ALJ inquire into any inconsistencies between the VE’s 
testimony and the DOT; it also requires that the evidence be substantial 
for the ALJ to make a decision.  However, this level of protection granted 
to claimants is nominal.206 
The inadequacies are apparent when the system struggles to define 
who qualifies as an expert.207  If the VEs are unqualified in statistical 
evaluation and yet are likely to implement various methodologies—
which arguably are not testable and are based on an obsolete 
occupational source—how can they be referred to as experts, and why 
should the SSA rely on their testimony in a disability proceeding?208 
As if the deck was not already stacked against the claimant, a 
claimant who wishes to challenge a VE’s testimony by arguing that the 
                                                                                                             
safeguards); supra note 180 and accompanying text (discussing the benefits of 
implementing a Daubert-type standard). 
203 See supra note 179 and accompanying text (discussing the Court’s test which balances 
the claimant’s level of loss and the burden placed on the government in implementing 
safeguards); see also infra Part IV.A.1 (discussing how implementation of a Daubert-type 
standard will assure institutional integrity).  But see WAGNER, supra note 154, at 100–12 
(discussing how implementing Daubert will infect policy decisions under the guise of 
challenging data, imposing a greater informational burden on agencies and slowing down 
the administrative process). 
204 See supra note 1 and accompanying text (discussing the issue of fairness with regard to 
expert witness testimony). 
205 See supra note 34 and accompanying text (discussing the balancing act between 
efficiency and fairness); see also Hu et al., supra note 6, at 10 (stating that theoretically all 
disabled applicants should be granted disability benefits and all physical and mentally able 
applicants denied benefits; however, as a result of imperfections in the adjudication 
process, inevitably some applicants who are disabled are denied). 
206 See TRAVER, supra note 2, § 1900.3 (stating that Rule 00-4p explains how VEs are relied 
upon for guidance, but that this Ruling fails to explain what makes a VE an expert); see 
supra note 131 and accompanying text (discussing how the Social Security Administration 
has implemented what has turned out to be merely quasi-safeguards). 
207 See supra note 168 and accompanying text (discussing Donahue v. Barnhart’s 
requirement that the claimant raise any objections to the VE’s testimony during the 
hearing, or else the right to object is deemed waived). 
208 See supra note 74 and accompanying text (discussing how the DOT and its 
methodology became obsolete upon the advent of the Department of Labor’s 
implementation of O*NET). 
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VE lacks qualifications, that a conflict of interest exists because the VE is 
hired and paid by the SSA, or that due process was violated, will rarely 
be successful by challenging the VE’s qualifications or by challenging 
that a conflict of interest exists.209  Additionally, if arguing that due 
process was violated, the claimant must show that the ALJ’s behavior, in 
the context of the whole case, was so extreme as to display clear inability 
to render a fair judgment—again, in such a case, a claimaint will rarely 
be successful.210 
These obstacles are nearly impossible to overcome, and it does not 
help the claimant that the courts are extremely deferential to the SSA.211  
Additionally, the claimant is more disadvantaged because he or she 
cannot directly attack the reliability of the VE’s testimony; rather, the 
claimant is forced to establish that the ALJ’s conduct is of such an 
extreme nature that a fair judgment is not possible.212 
For these reasons, the SSA should apply its statutory directives more 
vigorously by promulgating a Social Security Ruling directed at 
primarily VEs, the methodologies VEs implement, and the occupational 
sources on which VEs rely.  This promulgation should include the 
Daubert-type safeguards which are applied to all experts engaged in the 
federal judiciary. 
IV.  CONTRIBUTION 
When a grave injustice is wreaked on an individual by the presently powerful 
federal bureaucracy, it is a matter of concern to everyone.213 
 
Flowing from this analysis is one method that the SSA can use to 
address the intricate dilemmas regarding VE testimony at disability 
                                                 
209 See TRAVER, supra note 2, § 1900.3 (discussing how because there is a very minimal 
standard to be a VE, most challenges of the VE’s qualifications will fail); see also 
MCCORMICK, supra note 57, at 65 (discussing how the conflict of interest challenge will be 
rebuked because the VE receives the same fee no matter what way his testimony is 
directed). 
210 See supra note 67 and accompanying text (discussing the disadvantage that the 
claimant faces if the claimant attempts to directly challenge the reliability of the VE’s 
testimony). 
211 See Hu et al., supra note 6, at 11 (discussing how the SSA has aggressively and 
successfully defended its adjudication process, which has, in principle, been endorsed by 
Congress and the courts). 
212 See supra note 105 and accompanying text (discussing the SSA’s policies prohibiting an 
attack on the reliability of the VE testimony). 
213 Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 413 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting); see also supra 
note 2 and accompanying text (discussing how the outcome in millions of disability claims 
annually are decided at the fourth and fifth steps where the VE’s testimony is the lynch-pin 
to the claimant being entitled to benefits or not entitled to benefits). 
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hearings.  Promulgating a Social Security Ruling applicable to VEs will 
adequately address the concerns raised by unreliable VE testimony.   
Part IV.A.1 discusses a method that the SSA should use to 
appropriately implement Daubert standards for experts in non-
administrative settings, such as the federal judiciary, and also Daubert-
type standards within federal administrative settings, such as the Food 
and Drug Administration and the Environmental Protection Agency.214 
In addition to implementing Daubert-type standards applicable to 
VEs, Part IV.A.2 discusses how the promulgation should ensure that the 
qualifications of VEs are closely scrutinized and that a statistical and 
economical competency model qualifies VEs to break down and match 
the occupational code numbers with the existing jobs.215  Additionally, 
Part IV.A.3 discusses how the Social Security Ruling should mandate 
that VEs base their testimony only on current data and sources, thereby 
prohibiting the use of the obsolete DOT.216  Finally, Part IV.A.3 briefly 
summarizes the advantages of promulgating a Social Security Ruling 
applicable only to VEs at disability hearings.217 
A. Promulgation of a Social Security Ruling Applicable to Vocational Experts 
1. Implementation of a Daubert-type Standard for Vocational Experts 
The purpose of a Daubert-type standard is to subject federal agencies 
that deal with technical scientific data to a high standard.218  Because VE 
testimony is the lynch pin to the determination of millions of disability 
hearings each year, and to the determination of technical issues that arise 
regarding the occupational field, VEs must be held to a high standard.219 
                                                 
214 See infra Part IV.A.1 (discussing the implementation of a Daubert-type standard within 
SSA disability proceedings directed at VEs, and how this standard would ensure that VE 
methodologies and testimonies are reliable).  
215 See infra Part IV.A.2 (discussing how the Ruling should incorporate qualification 
requirements for VEs, thereby ensuring that all VEs meet high standards before they can 
give testimony at SSA disability proceedings).  
216 See infra Part IV.A.3 (discussing the need for the SSA to prohibit the use of the obsolete 
DOT and other outdated supplements which are not reliable sources for occupational 
data). 
217 See infra Part IV.A.3 (discussing the advantages of promulgating a Social Security 
Ruling that is directed explicitly at VEs, their methodologies, and the occupational sources 
upon which they may base their conclusions). 
218 See supra note 114 and accompanying text (discussing the four Daubert factors for 
assessing the reliability of a particular scientific theory or technique); see also Miller & Rein, 
supra note 114, at 298 (discussing how both the EPA and the FDA require scientific and 
technical knowledge and thus should be subject to Daubert discipline). 
219 See supra note 117 and accompanying text (noting that a higher standard should 
govern the admissibility of VE testimony because of the technical nature of the 
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This better-than-nothing mentality is not a reliable basis on which to 
award and deny critical, life-sustaining benefits to the disabled and 
disadvantaged, and absolutely no reason exists to allow ‘junk science’ or 
unreliable technical information to provide legally adequate support for 
an agency’s decision in any type of administrative action.220  An ALJ 
should no longer merely defer to a proposed VE on the ground that the 
VE has good credentials in a field that is unusual or difficult.221  Because 
under Daubert the expert’s evidence has to be adequate to support a 
decision, the evidence must be based on knowledge—not mere 
speculation.222  Thus, when the VE bases his or her testimony on 
unreliable occupational data or unsupported assumptions, that 
testimony should not be accepted, because justice will never be achieved 
without the presumption that the legal process is aimed at finding the 
truth.223  Because Daubert provides a suitable framework for reviewing 
the quality of agency science, and because a Daubert-type standard 
would ensure that the VE’s scientific methodology maintains a certain 
level of legitimacy, a Social Security Ruling incorporating a Daubert-type 
standard within the disability adjudication process should be 
promulgated.224 
2. Scrutinize the Qualifications of Vocational Experts 
Along with implementing a Daubert-type standard, the Social 
Security Ruling should include language addressing qualification 
standards for VEs.  Considering that no requirements exist to become a 
VE, and no training, supervision, or credential requirements apply to 
VEs, the Ruling proposed in this Note can address this concern by 
                                                                                                             
methodologies of VEs); see also infra Part IV.B (discussing the benefits of promulgating a 
Ruling that heightens the standards for VEs engaged by the SSA). 
220 TRAVER, supra note 2, §1400 (discussing how the SSA is traditionally slow to act in the 
face of change); see also supra note 115 and accompanying text (discussing how junk science 
should not be tolerated within any agency adjudication proceeding). 
221 See Miller & Rein, supra note 114, at 298 (discussing how both the EPA and the FDA 
require scientific and technical knowledge and thus should be subject to Daubert 
discipline). 
222 Id. at 315. 
223 See supra note 1 and accompanying text (discussing the value and importance of 
maintaining integrity within the process of finding truth); see also supra note 149 and 
accompanying text (discussing the need for legitimacy and how certain methodologies are 
better than others in the quest for truth). 
224 See supra Parts IV.A.1–3 (discussing how the implementation of a Daubert-type 
standard would be beneficial to the SSA because institutional credibility would remain 
intact and the notion of fairness would be preserved); see also supra note 115 and 
accompanying text (discussing how the implementation of a Daubert-type standard will 
force agencies to use good science within adjudication proceedings). 
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implementing a qualification standard that VEs must meet in order to be 
engaged by the SSA.225 
Additionally, a specific ruling pertaining to VEs could provide 
guidelines concerning acceptable methodologies for VEs to rely on when 
arriving at a conclusion.226  The ruling addressing acceptable 
methodologies should coincide with the implementation of a Daubert-
type standard that would ensure the legitimacy of the VE’s 
methodologies because, as stated previously, some sciences and 
methodologies are better than other sciences and methodologies in the 
search for objective truth.227  
3. Mandate the Use of Current Occupational Data and Sources 
By promulgating a Ruling that incorporates a Daubert-type standard 
and specifically addresses VE qualifications and acceptable 
methodologies, the SSA will be closer to restoring credibility in the 
disability determination process.  However, the Ruling would not be 
successful if it did not address the concern about the sources upon which 
VEs base their conclusions.228  If the promulgation included an 
additional requirement—that all sources upon which a VE bases 
conclusions be reliable, complete, and up-to-date—the SSA would 
ensure the integrity of VE testimony.229 
The SSA has an obligation to disability claimants to ensure that VEs 
(whose testimony might adversely affect the claimant’s case) base their 
                                                 
225 See TRAVER, supra note 2, § 1302 (discussing how no standards exist to become a VE—
no training, no supervision, and no credential requirements).  Although the SSA’s last 
promulgated ruling, 00-4p, addresses some issues regarding VEs, and although HALLEX 
has some guidelines for VEs, there is no particular Regulation or Ruling that specifically 
addresses VEs.  See supra note 9 and accompanying text (discussing the implications of 
S.S.R. 00-4p (Dec. 4, 2000)); see also TRAVER, supra note 2, § 1403.1 (discussing the 
requirements listed in SSA’s HALLEX). 
226 See supra note 75 and accompanying text (discussing the lack of VE’s statistical and 
economical competency and approaches that can be implemented to ensure accuracy). 
227 Mason, supra note 1, at 905; see also supra note 12 and accompanying text (discussing 
how the SSA is traditionally slow to act); supra note 149 and accompanying text (discussing 
the need for legitimacy and how certain methodologies are better than others in the quest 
for truth). 
228 See supra note 2 and accompanying text (discussing how reliance on the outdated and 
obsolete DOT undermines the adjudication process); see also TRAVER, supra note 2, § 1503 
(pointing out that the SSA is slow to act in the face of change, and explaining why the SSA 
has not published any new regulations to bridge the divide between its regulations and the 
O*NET methodology). 
229 See supra note 2 and accompanying text (discussing how VE testimony lacks validity, 
and, thus, the entire adjudication process fails because the integrity of the system has been 
compromised and concluding that this could be remedied by restoring the integrity of VE 
testimony). 
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findings on a foundational source that is up-to-date and reliable.230  As 
previously discussed, the DOT is neither up-to-date nor reliable.231  In 
fact, the DOT is obsolete, and the SSA’s failure to update it implies that 
the SSA has determined the DOT and its related data are better than 
nothing.232  However, as also previously mentioned, this type of 
mentality should not be tolerated, even in a massive bureaucratic 
institution.233  A better-than-nothing mentality is not a reliable basis on 
which to award and deny critical, life-sustaining benefits to the disabled 
and disadvantaged.234 
The following is a proposed Social Security Ruling incorporating a 
Daubert-type standard applicable to VEs.  It outlines the qualifications for 
VEs and describes acceptable occupational resources: 
Purpose:  This Ruling clarifies our standards for the use 
of Vocational Experts (“VEs”) who provide evidence at 
hearings before Administrative Law Judges (“ALJs”), 
and other reliable sources of occupational data in the 
evaluation of disability claims.235 
 
I. This Ruling emphasizes that the methodology of a VE 
must:  (1) be tested and capable of repetition; (2) have 
been subjected to peer-review; (3) have a known or 
potential rate of error and standards that control the 
technique’s operation; and (4) have enjoyed a general 
acceptance within the relevant scientific community. 
 
                                                 
230 See supra note 1 and accompanying text (discussing the obligation of the SSA to ensure 
that disability claimants are affored fair hearings). 
231 See supra note 75 and accompanying text (discussing the unreliability of the DOT and 
why VE should not rely upon the outdated occupational data contained within the DOT). 
232 See supra note 12 and accompanying text (discussing the SSA’s mentality regarding 
the DOT); see also supra note 176 and accompanying text (discussing how the SSA made the 
announcement that it was going to prohibit the use of the DOT, but then never carried out 
the plan). 
233 See supra note 12 and accompanying text (discussing how the balance between a 
better-than-nothing mindset and the crucial disability benefits that many claimants rely 
upon should tilt toward the latter). 
234 See supra note 1 and accompany text (discussing how the notion of justice will never 
be achieved without the presumption that the legal process is aimed at finding truth); see 
also supra note 149 (discussing the need for legitimacy and how certain methodologies are 
better than others in the quest for truth). 
235 See generally S.S.R. 00-4p (Dec. 4, 2000), available at www.ssa.gov/OP_Home/rulings/ 
di/02/SSR2000-04-di-02.html (illustrating the general format and structure of SSA 
Rulings). 
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II. Before the SSA may use a VE, said expert must meet the 
SSA’s requirements. A VE must have:  (1) satisfied all 
educational requirements, including (i) a Ph.D. in the 
occupational field; and (ii) documented occupational 
research abilities; (2) proven employment-placement 
experience; and (3) proven statistical or economic 
proficiency.  Additionally, the SSA shall keep a 
documented file on VEs.  This file must include the above 
mentioned documents.  To ensure ongoing competency, 
the SSA shall require VEs to attend training sessions.  
Last, the SSA shall review the qualifications of VEs on a 
yearly basis. 
III. For those VEs who meet the qualification standard, the 
ALJ may rely on the VE’s conclusions, only after the ALJ 
ensures that the conclusions were based on reliable, 
complete, and up-to-date occupational data.  Additionally, 
the ALJ must obtain an explanation for any deviations 
from the standard methodology and must explain in the 
decision how any identified deviation was resolved. 
B. The Advantages of the Proposed Social Security Ruling Applicable to 
Vocational Experts 
Promulgating a Ruling that applies only to VEs testifying at a 
disability hearing has three advantages.  First, implementing a Ruling 
that incorporates a Daubert-type standard will ensure that VE 
methodologies are reliable.236  Second, promulgating a Ruling that 
describes the requirements to be a VE, including, but not limited to, the 
educational background, the credential requirements and the required 
training needed, will ensure that the SSA only relies on qualified 
experts.237  Third, a Ruling that mandates the use of only reliable 
occupational sources will ensure the legitimacy of VE testimony and 
thus the entire disability system.238 
                                                 
236 See supra Part IV.A.1 (discussing the practical effects of promulgating a Social Security 
Ruling, applicable to VEs, that incorporates a Daubert-type standard). 
237 See supra Part IV.A.2 (discussing the benefits of implementing a Ruling that defines 
the qualification requirements to be a VE engaged by the SSA). 
238 See supra Part IV.A.3 (discussing the positive impact of promulgating a Social Security 
Ruling that mandates the use of only reliable, complete, and up-to-date occupational data 
and sources). 
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V.  CONCLUSION 
Vocational evidence is the building block of the fourth and fifth steps 
of the sequential disability determination process.  With millions of 
disability benefits granted or denied at those steps, the significance of 
this vocational evidence should not be understated.  Vocational evidence 
within the SSA’s disability adjudication process is valuable for its ability 
to lead the ALJ to truth, but only if it is based upon reliable and up-to-
date occupational data.  If the integrity of this testimonial evidence is 
compromised, then the entire disability process crumbles because the 
validity of the conclusion depends primarily upon the manner in which 
it was reached. 
With a large adjudication system, both the efficiency of the SSA and 
the level of fairness afforded to disability claimants must be balanced.  
Currently, this balance favors the disability system, and the SSA has 
adopted a better-than-nothing mentality concerning the vocational 
evidence dilemma.  However, a balance between efficiency and the level 
of fairness provided to the claimant can be achieved by promulgating a 
Ruling applicable to VEs.  This Ruling would incorporate a Daubert-type 
standard, a concrete guideline regarding VE qualifications and 
acceptable methodologies, and a requirement that all VE testimony be 
based on up-to-date, reliable occupational data.  The Ruling proposed in 
this Note addresses the current imbalance, and correspondingly allows 
the SSA to ensure the integrity of its disability adjudication system and 
maintain a system whereby claimants are afforded an adequate level of 
protection against arbitrary and capricious testimony. 
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